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More immigrants come to the United States than to any other country in the world; more come to 
California than to any other state; and more settle in Southern California, especially the coastal 
corridor from Los Angeles to San Diego on the Mexican border, than in any other metropolitan region. 
The United States is home for a fifth of the world’s migrant population (United Nations 2006). 
California is home for more than a fourth of all immigrants in the U.S., and more than a fourth of the 
state’s population is foreign-born—a significantly greater proportion than any other state (Portes and 
Rumbaut 2006). And Southern California—a region of 21 million people encompassing the six 
contiguous counties of Los Angeles, Orange, San Diego, Riverside, San Bernardino, and Ventura, 
colloquially known as “SoCal”—is home to the largest concentrations of Mexicans, Salvadorans, 
Guatemalans, Filipinos, Koreans, Japanese, Taiwanese, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Iranians, and other 
nationalities found outside of their respective countries of origin, and to sizable contingents of others, 
such as the Armenians, mainland Chinese, Hondurans, Indians, Laotians, Russian and Israeli Jews, 
and several Arab nationalities (Rumbaut 2004). Indeed, most of the largest immigrant nationalities that 
have settled in the United States since the 1960s—including the largest concentrations of refugees and 
of immigrant professionals, entrepreneurs, and unauthorized laborers—have established their primary 
settlements in greater Los Angeles, with the 1980s standing out as a decade of exceptional growth.  
This demographic shift is all the more extraordinary when seen in the context of the region’s recent 
past. As the historian Jon Weiner (2008) has observed, “from 1920 to 1960, Los Angeles was the 
whitest and most Protestant city in the United States, and the American city with the smallest 
proportion of immigrants—just 8 percent in 1960.” In the post-World War II period, especially in the 
1950s and early 1960s, SoCal came to be idealized as a paradise of sunshine, opportunity, youth 
culture and the “good life” in the popular imagination (May 2002)—an identity that was challenged 
and lost amid the upheavals of the 1960s. But much deeper transformations followed in the decades 
since. By 2007, Los Angeles County had the largest ethnic minority population in the country—7.1 
million, or 71% of its total county population of 10 million—including the largest concentrations of 
Hispanics and Asians, the overwhelming majority of whom were of foreign birth or foreign parentage 
(U.S. Census Bureau 2007). (Indeed, Los Angeles County was home to one in every 14 of the nation's 
minority residents; the county's minority population alone was higher than the total population of all 
but 12 states.) For that matter, SoCal’s other counties (Orange, San Diego, Riverside, San Bernardino 
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and Ventura) were also “majority-minority,” with populations that were more than 50% minority 
residents. 
What happens to these diverse immigrants and to their offspring, to the communities where they settle, 
and to the formation of new patterns of ethnic inequality, constitutes a complex puzzle that raises 
issues of critical theoretical, practical, and policy significance, and is the subject of ongoing and 
heated public and political debates. This paper presents findings from Southern California on the 
mobility trajectories of the bourgeoning generation of foreign-parentage young adults, focusing on key 
ethnic groups with distinct modes of incorporation, compared to native-parentage white, black and 
Mexican-American peers.  
The Problem in National Context 
After four decades of accelerating migration flows, by 2006 about 38 million foreign-born persons 
were living in the United States, more than half of whom (56%) had immigrated since 1990, primarily 
from Latin America and Asia (U.S. Census Bureau 2007a). The U.S.-born second generation (with 
one or two foreign-born parents) totaled more than 30 million in 2006, so that immigrants and their 
children today add up to some 70 million persons, comprising 23% of the national total—and half of 
all Californians. The new immigration has transformed the ethnic composition of the U.S., sprouting 
ethnic “majority-minority” states (including California itself in 2000) and counties—nationally, about 
one in ten counties is now more than 50% minority (U.S. Census Bureau 2007b). Indeed, the 2000 
census found that for the first time three Hispanic surnames—García, Rodríguez, and Martínez—were 
among the eleven most common in the U.S., displacing Wilson, Anderson and Taylor; Hernández, 
López, González, Pérez and Sánchez were not far behind (Roberts 2007).  
New American ethnic groups are forming faster than ever, a process that has been accompanied by the 
official construction of one-size-fits-all pan-ethnic categories such as “Asians” and “Hispanics” into 
which newcomers from many different countries and cultures are classified (Rumbaut and Portes 
2001). The U.S. Census Bureau (2004a, 2004b) announced that in 2003 Hispanics surpassed African 
Americans to become the largest minority in the country—and notably, for the first time in decades, 
their growth is now due more to natural increase than to immigration (Tienda et al., 2006). Although 
Hispanics (45 million in 2007) comprise 15% of the population, they have accounted for half of U.S. 
population growth since 2000; given their higher fertility (2.9 children per woman in 2006) and 
youthful age structure (a median age of 27, compared to 41 for non-Hispanic whites), they will 
account for the lion’s share of U.S. population growth for the next several decades—regardless of 
what happens with immigration (Haub 2006; cf. Myers 2007). Overall, the immigrant-stock 
population, the largest ever, is young—and as today’s U.S.-born new second generation, with a 
median age of 12, reaches adulthood in large numbers within the next decade, their impact will be 
increasingly and widely felt in higher education, the labor market, sports and popular culture, criminal 
justice and religious institutions, the mall and the ballot box. They are coming of age in an aging 
society undergoing profound social and economic transformations—amid a hostile political backlash 
and rising animus toward immigrants, growing since the passage of Proposition 187 in California in 
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1994, and exacerbated after September 11, 2001. Perhaps not astonishingly—after a period of stepped-
up deportations, workplace raids, and the passage of hundreds of state laws and local ordinances 
restricting access to driver’s licenses, education, employment, housing, even library cards—the 2007 
National Survey of Latinos found that 53% of all Hispanic adults in the U.S. (about a quarter of whom 
are undocumented immigrants) feared that they, a family member or close friend would be deported 
(Pew Hispanic Center 2007; cf. Johnson 2005; Kanstroom 2007). 
The ethnic and national diversity of contemporary immigrants pales in comparison to the diversity of 
their social class origins. By far the most educated and the least educated groups in the United States 
today are immigrants, a reflection of polar-opposite types of migrations embedded in different 
historical contexts—and inserted in an “hourglass-shaped” labor market, increasingly bifurcated into 
high-tech/high-wage and manual/low-wage sectors, which attracts both immigrant professionals and 
undocumented laborers. They come through regular immigration channels, or without legal 
authorization, or as state-sponsored refugees—legal statuses which interact with their human capital to 
shape distinct modes of incorporation. The undocumented tend to consist disproportionately of manual 
laborers, whose legal vulnerability makes them in turn more economically exploitable and likely to be 
concentrated in central cities; their children in turn tend to grow up in neighborhoods and attend 
schools where they are exposed disproportionately to peer groups involved with youth gangs and 
intergroup violence. “Brain drain” professionals mainly enter under the occupational preferences of 
U.S. law, and some are also found among the first waves of refugee flows; they are more likely to 
become naturalized citizens and, usually within the first generation, homeowners in the suburbs. 
Internal group characteristics, including the structure and cohesiveness of their families, interact in 
complex but patterned ways with external contexts of reception—government policies and programs, 
the state of the economy in the areas where they settle, employer preferences in local labor markets, 
the extent of racial discrimination and nativist hostility, the strength of existing ethnic communities—
to form the conditions within which immigrants and their children adapt to different segments of 
American society (Portes and Zhou 1993; Rumbaut and Portes 2001). 
If the immigrants are different, so is the society into which they are being absorbed. The incorporation 
of these newcomers since the 1970s has coincided with a post-industrial period of economic 
restructuring and rising inequality in income, wealth, and social well-being (Massey 2007), producing 
a “Great U-Turn” (Harrison and Bluestone 1988) that by the 1990s had led to levels of economic 
stratification not seen since the 1920s. As the returns to education and advanced educational 
credentials sharply increased, post-secondary schooling lengthened for young adults, increasingly 
extending into the mid to late twenties (with continuing parental support, if available). As the earnings 
and job stability of young workers fell relative to the cost of supporting a family, women entered the 
labor market in large numbers and worked longer hours, and two-income families and delayed 
childbearing became the norm, accompanied by changes in family forms—including what has come to 
be called a “retreat from marriage,” with high divorce rates (which peaked in 1980 but have remained 
high since) and sharp increases in cohabitation and non-marital childbearing (Landale et al. 2006). 
Unmarried childbearing reached a new record high in 2006, with the non-marital birth rate reaching 
50.6 births per 1,000 unmarried females; indeed, unmarried mothers now account for nearly 40% of all 
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U.S. births (in contrast, the percentage of all live births in the U.S. to mothers under 20 is just over 
10%, having last peaked in 1991 and declined since, although the rate is highest among Hispanic 
teens) (Hamilton et al., 2007). Normative transitions to adulthood have thus become less predictable 
and more prolonged (Danziger and Rouse, 2007; Settersten et al. 2005). At the same time, the present 
era of mass immigration has unfolded during an era of mass imprisonment in the U.S. (Pettit and 
Western 2004; Rumbaut 2005b). The number of adults incarcerated in federal or state prisons or local 
jails in the U.S. more than quadrupled from 1980 to 2006; including those on probation or parole, over 
7 million adults were under correctional supervision in the U.S. in 2006 (U.S. Department of Justice 
2007). The majority are young men, from racial or ethnic minorities, with less than a high school 
education.  
In this context, as post-secondary educational attainment has become critical to social mobility for 
both men and women, incarceration and early childbearing have emerged as key turning points that 
block or disrupt educational and occupational opportunities to develop human capital and move into 
the economic mainstream (Raphael 2007; Rumbaut 2005b; cf. Elder 1998). Having children at an early 
age is more strongly and negatively associated with the educational attainments and occupational 
choices of women than of men (Marini 1984; Feliciano and Rumbaut 2005). A prison record is linked 
to unemployment, lower wages, marital and family instability, and severe restrictions on social and 
voting rights (Manza and Uggen 2006; Western 2002; Western et al. 2001), as well as to stigmatized 
identities and pathways to criminal recidivism (Laub and Sampson 2003). In a cycle of cumulative 
disadvantage, young men and women with low levels of education are significantly more likely to 
become a prisoner or to become a parent, respectively, than same-age and same-sex peers with higher 
levels of education—and to widen social and economic inequalities in the process.  
What do we know about foreign-parentage young adults in this transformed national context, and of 
their patterns of social mobility (cf. Alba and Nee, 2003; Portes and Fernández-Kelly, 2006)? How do 
they fare vis-à-vis native-parentage peers? Unfortunately, decennial census data on parental nativity, 
which had until 1970 permitted the identification of the foreign-born (the first generation) from the 
U.S.-born of foreign parentage (second generation) and of native parentage (third and beyond 
generations), have not been collected since 1980. Instead, scholarship on adult outcomes among the 
new second generation has relied mainly on the Current Population Survey (CPS), which after 1994 
incorporated the parental nativity questions in its annual demographic survey of a nationally 
representative household sample (but which is limited in other respects); and especially designed 
regional surveys, such as the third wave of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS-III) 
(Portes and Rumbaut, 2005); the Immigrant Second Generation in Metropolitan New York (ISGMNY) 
study (Kasinitz et al. 2008); and the Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los 
Angeles (IIMMLA) survey (Rumbaut et al. 2003). The merged IIMMLA and CILS-San Diego 
samples will be the focus of the analysis that will follow. But first we turn to an examination of 
national-level CPS data. 
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Young Adults in the United States, by Gender and Generation 
Tables 1a and 1b provide a profile of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of Hispanic and 
non-Hispanic white, black, and Asian young adults 18 to 34 in the U.S. in 2006, broken down by 
gender (Table 1a) and generation (Table 1b). Those four ethnoracial groupings accounted for 65.5 
million young adults in the United States, or nearly 98% of the total (the remainder consists of Native 
American and “mixed race” populations). Among Hispanics (two thirds of whom are of Mexican 
descent), there is a much greater proportion of males than females (54% to 46%)—a reflection of 
disproportionate numbers of young male migrant workers in this population. By contrast, only 46% of 
black young adults are males—a reflection in part of the fact that these estimates are drawn from a 
household survey of the non-institutionalized population and miss a disproportionate number of young 
black males who are incarcerated or in the military. “Non-Hispanic whites” and “blacks” are 
overwhelmingly long-term natives (nearly 90%), whereas 95% of “Asian” and 80% of “Hispanic” 
groups are of foreign birth or parentage (1st or 2nd generation). The newcomers in turn are situated at 
the polar ends of the opportunity structure, so that both an ethnic and a class divide (or “ethclasses,” to 
revive Milton Gordon’s term) are immediately apparent. Educational and related inequalities between 
whites and blacks seem narrow compared to the gulf that separates Asians from Hispanics. Asian men 
and women are at the top of the educational hierarchy: an extraordinary 62% had 4-year college or 
advanced degrees (nearly twice the 33% rate of white men), while only 8% failed to complete high 
school (compared to 12% of white men). Latinos are at the bottom: 41% of young adult males had not 
finished high school, and fewer than one in ten had earned college or advanced degrees. Particularly 
striking is the range in the attainment of advanced degrees (professional, master’s or doctorates), from 
25% of Asian men to 8% of whites, 3% of blacks, and 2% of Hispanics. Young Latino men are also 
mired in the lowest rungs of the U.S. labor market, with nearly two out of three employed in low-wage 
labor, while 54% of Asian young men were employed in the highest status jobs. Non-Hispanic whites 
and blacks fall between those two poles. On the other hand, Hispanic men 18-34 have the highest 
labor force participation rate (87%) and are the most likely to be working full-time (70%); in fact, they 
are half as likely as young black men to be jobless (19% to 39%), and much less likely to be 
incarcerated (as estimated from 2000 census data). Hispanic women, in turn, are much more likely 
than the other groups to have children (48%), and Asian women are least likely—but both Hispanic 
and Asian women are more likely to be married than blacks or whites. Nonetheless, while Asians have 
higher family incomes and personal earnings, whites have the lowest poverty rates and blacks have the 
highest.  
Table 1b breaks down these differences in socioeconomic status and family formation by generation 
within each of the panethnic groups, to examine the extent of intergenerational change from the 
foreign-born cohorts (1st generation) to those of foreign parentage (2nd generation) and native 
parentage (3rd and higher generations). Key comparisons are to 3rd-or-higher-generation whites and 
blacks—i.e., to native-stock majority and minority groups. (Significantly, first- and second-generation 
“whites” and “blacks”—from a wide range of immigrant origins in Europe, Canada, the Middle East, 
Africa, the Afro-Caribbean, and elsewhere—show much better outcomes on every indicator than do 
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Table 1a. 
Social and Economic Characteristics of Young Adults in the United States, 18 to 34, by Panethnicity and Gender 
                          
 
     Non-Hispanic 
Selected Characteristics  Hispanic  Asian  Black  White 
(Figures are column percentages unless noted) Male Female   Male Female   Male Female   Male Female 
             Total young adults (18 to 34): N 6,737,822 5,752,740  1,622,549 1,687,121  3,973,738 4,642,216  20,579,352 20,518,648 
             Nativity/generation:1             
   Foreign-born (1st gen.) % 58.8 51.9  69.6 75.5  10.3 9.3  4.8 4.8 
   US-born, foreign-born parent (2nd gen.) % 21.5 25.0  25.3 20.7  4.5 4.1  4.5 4.4 
   US-born, US-born parents (3rd+ gen.) % 19.6 23.1  5.1 3.8  85.2 86.5  90.8 90.7 
             Educational attainment:2              
  Less than high school % 40.8 35.3  8.1 7.4  18.5 16.6  12.2 9.4 
  High school graduate only % 31.5 29.7  16.6 15.5  39.7 33.4  31.2 25.7 
  Some college % 20.8 26.0  29.7 29.3  30.7 35.4  34.3 37.3 
  Bachelor's degree (25 and older) % 7.8 10.2  36.7 41.7  14.0 15.7  25.0 28.3 
  Advanced degree (25 and older) % 2.0 2.6  25.1 20.5  3.1 5.2  7.9 10.2 
             Labor force status:             
  Working full-time % 69.8 41.0  59.0 42.3  50.5 47.0  64.9 47.4 
  Working part-time % 10.9 14.7  12.6 14.7  10.7 14.2  13.3 22.0 
  Not working % 19.3 44.3  28.4 43.0  38.9 38.8  21.8 30.6 
             Occupational status index:3             
   Low-wage labor (SEI < 25) % 63.4 33.9  26.1 19.2  51.1 29.6  38.9 21.9 
   Middle (SEI > 25) % 21.7 38.2  20.3 31.8  27.6 39.8  27.5 35.5 
   Higher (SEI > 50) % 14.9 27.9  53.5 49.0  21.4 30.6  33.6 42.6 
             Economic status:             
  Poverty rate (below poverty line) % 16.4 25.6  12.9 13.3  18.6 29.2  8.4 12.7 
  Family annual income $ 44,481 42,456  69,247 70,810  46,703 38,105  65,788 62,605 
  Earnings (of those working) $ 24,330 19,484  40,957 31,305  25,448 21,245  33,635 24,012 
             Marital and parental status:             
  Never married % 53.9 38.8  64.4 44.3  69.0 65.6  54.8 42.5 
  Cohabiting % 6.4 7.4  2.4 4.3  7.6 6.3  8.0 9.3 
  Currently married % 36.2 47.4  31.8 48.8  19.6 20.7  33.7 42.5 
  Divorced, separated % 3.5 6.4  1.3 2.6  3.7 7.4  3.5 5.7 
             
  Has one or more children % -- 48.0  -- 31.6  -- 42.8  -- 37.1 
             Incarcerated (males only): % 3.26 --  0.72 --  11.15 --  1.68 -- 
             Source: Merged Current Population Surveys, 2003-06.  Note: Incarceration data are estimated from the 2000 census.     
1
  1st generation = foreign-born; 2nd = U.S.-born, one or both parents foreign-born; 3rd or higher = U.S.-born, both parents       
2
  Educational attainment for Bachelor's degree or higher is reported only for 25-34          
3   Socioeconomic index (SEI): higher = professional, technical, white-collar occupations with SEI        
    middle = services and skilled blue-collar jobs with SEI scores above 25; low = jobs with SEI scores below 25.      
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Table 1b. 
Social and Economic Characteristics of Young Adults in the United States, 18 to 34, by Panethnicity and Generation 
                                  
 
      Non-Hispanic 
Selected Characteristics  Hispanic  Asian  Black  White 
Generation1:   1st 2nd 3rd+   1st 2nd 3rd+   1st 2nd 3rd+   1st 2nd 3rd+ 
                 
Total young adults (18 to 34): N 5,150,866 4,687,097 2,652,439  1,568,756 1,593,997 146,917  540,549 671,004 7,402,978  1,212,777 2,587,471 37,296,700 
                 
Educational attainment:2                 
  Less than high school % 56.2 28.5 20.8  6.5 9.1 6.7  15.3 12.6 18.1  10.1 8.9 10.9 
  High school graduate % 27.8 31.0 35.8  15.0 17.0 16.6  31.2 25.7 37.6  26.0 22.4 28.9 
  Some college % 10.3 31.3 33.8  20.6 37.5 38.5  31.2 43.5 32.5  22.7 37.6 36.1 
  Bachelor's degree (25 and older) % 5.6 12.8 11.3  38.3 41.2 34.6  19.7 23.2 13.9  30.4 33.3 26.1 
  Advanced degree (25 and older) % 1.6 2.8 3.3  27.5 16.1 15.8  7.9 7.8 3.7  18.6 12.5 8.4 
                 
Labor force status:                 
  Working full-time % 59.6 53.9 55.0  52.2 48.9 49.4  55.9 42.6 48.6  56.8 52.2 56.3 
  Working part-time % 10.1 14.1 15.3  11.0 15.7 19.9  14.4 15.3 12.2  12.4 17.7 17.9 
  Not working % 30.3 32.0 29.7  36.8 35.4 30.7  29.7 42.1 39.2  30.9 30.0 25.8 
                 
Occupational status index:3                 
   Low-wage labor (SEI < 25) % 74.3 38.4 34.5  23.2 22.3 27.4  46.4 29.0 39.9  30.1 24.7 31.4 
   Middle (SEI > 25) % 16.8 34.8 37.1  20.7 30.1 25.3  27.7 39.2 34.2  23.9 32.1 31.4 
   Higher (SEI > 50) % 8.9 26.8 28.4  56.1 47.6 47.2  25.9 31.8 25.9  45.9 43.1 37.2 
                 
Economic status:                 
  Poverty rate (below poverty line) % 25.8 17.1 16.6  15.8 10.9 8.8  19.7 13.8 25.6  13.7 8.9 10.6 
  Family annual income $ 35,206 48,642 50,256  63,345 75,561 81,352  44,838 57,138 40,204  61,893 74,756 63,521 
  Earnings (of those working) $ 20,252 23,936 24,612  39,911 33,615 35,725  23,938 26,430 22,818  35,356 31,741 28,803 
                 
Marital and parental status:                 
  Never married % 35.5 57.2 51.1  38.5 69.0 61.1  55.0 76.9 67.2  33.8 57.5 48.5 
  Cohabiting % 5.8 6.7 9.1  2.3 4.2 5.5  4.5 3.7 7.3  5.3 6.9 8.9 
  Currently married % 54.1 31.9 33.5  57.2 24.9 30.5  36.6 15.1 19.5  57.6 32.6 37.8 
  Divorced, separated % 4.6 4.3 6.3  2.0 1.9 3.0  3.9 4.2 5.9  3.3 3.1 4.8 
                 
  Has children (females only) % 56.2 37.2 41.9  36.4 13.8 32.1  37.3 21.7 44.4  39.3 29.8 37.3 
                 
Incarcerated (males only):4 % 0.99 6.72  0.29 1.86  2.47 11.61  0.57 1.71 
                                  
                 
Source: Merged Current Population Surveys, 2003-06.  (Figures are column percentages unless noted.)         
1
  1st generation = foreign-born; 2nd = U.S.-born, one or both parents foreign-born; 3rd or higher =           
2
  Educational attainment for Bachelor's degree or higher are reported only for 25-34 year olds.          
3
  Socioeconomic index (SEI): higher = professional, technical, white-collar occupations with SEI (Duncan) scores above 50;          
        middle = services and skilled blue-collar jobs with SEI scores above 25; low = jobs with SEI scores below 25.          
4
  Incarceration data are estimated from the 2000 census, for foreign-born and U.S.-born males 18-34.  Among the U.S.-born, census data do not       
 Working Paper Nr. 14 | Page 9 of 46 
their native-stock counterparts.) Among Hispanics, the data show rapid upward educational, 
occupational and economic mobility from the first to the second generation. That in part reflects the 
very low starting points of the foreign-born. For example, the proportion with less than a high school 
diploma is cut in half from the first to the second (56% to 28%), though the figure of 21% by the third-
plus remains double that of whites. Among foreign-born Latin Americans, many (especially 
undocumented labor migrants from Mexico and Central America) came to work in their teens and had 
not completed secondary schooling in their country of origin (it is not so much that they “dropped out” 
of high school than that they never “dropped in”). College graduation rates double from 7% among the 
foreign-born to 14% among the US-born. On the other hand, despite these positive indices, the rate of 
incarceration among Hispanic men sharply increases from less than 1% among the foreign-born to 
6.7% among the U.S.-born—less than the 11.6% incarceration rate seen among native blacks, but 
much higher than the 1.7% rate among native whites. Because of the very high levels of education 
brought by immigrants from India, Taiwan and other Asian countries (a function of “brain-drain” 
migration histories noted earlier), we do not see the same pattern of upward intergenerational social 
mobility among Asians. Instead, among Asians, two out of three hold a Bachelor’s degree or higher in 
the immigrant generation (and a remarkable 28% hold advanced degrees); those rates drop to 57% 
(and 16%) in the second generation, and 50% in the third-plus. Despite the relative decline across 
generations, college graduation rates among Asians in every cohort are still far higher than any of the 
other groups. A similar pattern is repeated with regard to occupational status, with 56% of the first 
generation, compared to 47% of the second and 3rd+ generations, holding high-status jobs. Still, 
poverty rates decrease across generations, and family incomes increase. While the process of 
intergenerational change is only hinted at with these data, the formation of new patterns of urban 
ethnic inequality seems evident. 
Immigrant Nationalities and Modes of Incorporation 
This cross-sectional national profile of young adults provided by the CPS, while useful, conceals more 
than it reveals. The panethnic categories of “Asians” and “Hispanics” are not homogeneous, but lump 
together many different nationalities, migration histories, legal statuses, phenotypes, class and cultural 
backgrounds, and local contexts of adaptation in the U.S. Table 2 begins to unpack these categories by 
examining the largest immigrant nationalities in the U.S., and providing a typology of three main 
modes of incorporation based on (1) legal status at entry as classified by the government (with or 
without authorization, or as state-sponsored refugees—or entry through the “front gate,” the “back 
door” or the “side door” [cf. Zolberg 2006]), and (2) human capital (as indicated by their level of 
education, ranging from professionals and entrepreneurs to manual laborers) (cf. Feliciano 2006). Each 
type is represented by several nationalities, but each nationality may also include individuals 
representing different types (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Mode I is typified by groups composed of a 
majority of unauthorized laborers with less than a high school education (Mexicans, Salvadorans and 
Guatemalans—and more recently Hondurans); Mode II is exemplified by groups composed of a 
majority of legal permanent residents with college degrees or more advanced credentials (Filipinos, 
Chinese, Koreans, and Indians); and Mode III comprises groups admitted with refugee status (and 
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Table 2. 
National Origins and Modes of Incorporation: Main Types (by Legal Status and Education)  
and Largest Foreign-Born Nationalities in U.S. and California, 2006 
                            
 Foreign-born population in the United States  Foreign-born population 
 Foreign-born total  Undocumented proportion  Education (ages 25-64)   in California 
National Origin 
     
% of group   % college  % less than   
  
% of (U.S.) 
  N (000s) % (of US)  N (000s) % (of US)  that is undoc.  graduate high school  N (000s) %  group in Calif. 
Modes of incorporation:              
Mode I:               
Low education, unauthorized             
Mexican 11,535 30.8  6,570 57.0 56.9  5.8 60.0  4,396 44.4 42.6 
Salvadoran, Guatemalan 1,783 4.8  940 8.0 52.7  5.6 59.6  678 6.8 43.9 
Mode II:               
High education, legal entry              
Filipino 1,634 4.4  280 2.4 17.1  51.7 2.7  750 7.6 47.7 
Chinese, Taiwanese 1,933 5.2  190 1.6 9.8  54.8 15.8  659 6.7 37.5 
Korean 1,021 2.7  250 2.2 24.4  57.8 2.9  323 3.3 30.6 
Indian 1,505 4.0  270 2.3 17.9  80.6 3.6  303 3.1 19.5 
Mode III:               
Refugees, state-sponsored              
Vietnamese 1,116 3.0  160 1.4 14.3  31.7 21.3  446 4.5 42.4 
Cambodian, Laotian 329 0.9  NA NA NA  8.4 53.7  121 1.2 36.4 
Cuban 936 2.5  † † †  25.5 25.3  42 0.4 4.5 
Total 37,548 100   11,550 100 30.8   26.7 32.0   9,902 100 26.4 
              
Sources: American Community Survey 2006 (US Census Bureau 2007); Office of Immigration Statistics, DHS (Hoefer et al. 2007), for estimates of the undocumented population. 
†  The Cuban-born population in the U.S. was excluded from these estimates by DHS (Department of Homeland Security) since, according to immigration law (and under the  
   U.S. government's "wet foot/dry foot" policy that is applicable only to Cubans), few Cubans living in the U.S. more than a year are at risk of being unauthorized. 
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access to public assistance on the same basis as U.S. citizens), albeit with a mixed (often low) human 
capital profile (Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians, and Cubans). Nine of these nationalities (the 
Indians and Cubans excepted)—three groups per type—make up the bulk of the IIMMLA and CILS-
III Southern California samples that will be the focus of analysis below. 
While the nearly 38 million foreign-born in the U.S. in 2006 came from some 190 countries, 11.5 
million (31%) came from only one: Mexico. Another 9 million (24%) came from China (including 
Taiwan), the Philippines, India, Vietnam, Korea, and El Salvador and Guatemala.2 More than half 
(55%) of the foreign-born population has come from these nations—all with close historical ties to the 
U.S., including prior neo-colonial episodes and wars (India is a main exception in that regard). Those 
are also the principal sources of international migration to California, accounting for more than three-
fourths of the state total. Of the 9.9 million foreign-born residing in California, Mexico alone accounts 
for 44%, and the other seven for 32%, as shown in Table 2. Moreover, while California is home for 
10% of the native-born population of the U.S., between a third and a half of each of these foreign-born 
groups is concentrated in California (except for the Indians, who are relatively more dispersed). 
In 2006, data from the Department of Homeland Security estimated the unauthorized population of the 
U.S. at 11.6 million (Hoefer et al. 2007; see also Passel 2006)—more than tripling since the early 
1990s. Thus, nearly a third (31%) of the foreign-born today are undocumented (most “entered without 
inspection,” while as many as 40% entered legally but then overstayed their visas). Of the rest, about 
one third consist of legal permanent residents, and another third are naturalized citizens. An 
immigrant’s legal status is a critical factor in shaping mobility trajectories—and an unauthorized status 
can affect virtually every facet of an immigrant’s life (cf. Menjívar 2006b). As Table 2 documents, all 
of the principal sources of legal immigration to the U.S. are also among the top sources of 
unauthorized migration. More than half of all Mexican (57%) and Salvadoran and Guatemalan (53%) 
immigrants in the U.S. today are undocumented—together they account for nearly two thirds of the 
unauthorized population—but so are substantial proportions of the Koreans (24%), Indians (18%), 
Filipinos (17%), Vietnamese (14%) and Chinese (10%).  
More specifically, within each of the three main types specified above, we can elaborate as follows on 
the nationalities that represent modal tendencies of each type, as well as note features that distinguish 
them from each other: 
Mode I (preponderantly unauthorized laborers with less than a high school education): 
The Mexicans are part of the longest and largest labor migration in the world today, and their 
story needs to be understood in the historical context of their long-time presence in California and 
the Southwest, which was once part of Mexico (Massey et al. 2002). With 6 million persons of 
Mexican descent in Southern California alone (and about 28 million in the country), they 
constitute by far the largest source of both legal and unauthorized immigration in the U.S., as well 
 
2
 Cuba and Canada ranked 8th and 9th in size of their foreign-born populations in 2006, each with less than 1 million, and the Dominican 
Republic was essentially tied with Guatemala for 10th—but the Cubans and Dominicans are concentrated in Florida and New York. 
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as the adult population with the lowest levels of education in the nation. Of the estimated 11.5 
million unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. in 2006, most (57%) were Mexican nationals. Of the 
nearly 3 million legalized under the amnesty provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act [IRCA] of 1986, two thirds were Mexican nationals; an INS survey (1992) of the national 
legalized population found that 25% resided in the Los Angeles area alone. 
The Salvadorans and Guatemalans, who form the largest flows from Central America, share with 
the Mexicans the fact that a sizable proportion of them remain in unauthorized or (unlike any of 
the other groups) perennially uncertain and marginally legal statuses; and with the Vietnamese 
the fact that in the 1980s most came as refugees, from the Central American wars of the era—but 
were not recognized as refugees by the U.S. government (Coutin 2007; García 2006; Menjívar 
2006a, 2006b). The Salvadorans, with scarcely a visible presence in the U.S. until after 1980, 
have grown rapidly among all Latin American-origin groups in the country, already surpassing 
the Cubans—and are disproportionately located in Los Angeles County. Estimates of the 
unauthorized immigrant population in the U.S. rank Salvadorans and Guatemalans as the largest 
groups after Mexicans, accounting for 8% of the total—and they also rank after Mexicans in their 
low levels of education. 
Mode II (preponderantly regular immigrants with college degrees or more advanced credentials): 
The Filipinos have the lowest poverty rate of any major ethnic group in the U.S. (a reflection of a 
large component of professionals among those who migrate, especially nurses), the highest 
proportion of immigrant enlistment in the U.S. military (principally the U.S. Navy), and are the 
largest sole-country source of immigration from Asia in California and the U.S. They are the only 
Asian country to have been colonized directly by the U.S. (and before that by Spain for three 
centuries)—sharing a number of historical commonalities with Puerto Rico—with the 
consequence that they are the only “Asians” who bear Spanish surnames, are preponderantly 
Roman Catholics, and (as with Indians) by and large speak English pre-arrival (cf. Espiritu 2003).  
The Chinese are a complex, diverse, bimodal population (including at once highly educated 
professionals and others with only an elementary schooling), coming from multiple sources 
(mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong) and divergent class origins, but in most recent studies 
(e.g., Kasinitz et al. 2008; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Zhou and Xiong 2005) their young adults 
are found at the very top of educational achievement rankings, despite modest social class origins 
in some cases. The Taiwanese especially rank with immigrants from India as the most educated 
population in the U.S. 
The Koreans represent yet another distinct tendency within this general mode of incorporation, 
especially in contrast to the Filipinos (who have one of the lowest rates of self-employment in the 
country): the Koreans are at the other end, with by far the highest rates of entrepreneurship of any 
ethnic group in the U.S., native-born or foreign-born (Min 2005; Light and Bonacich 1988). In 
this regard the modal Korean case, reminiscent of such early 20th-century cases as those of the 
Japanese in California and the Jews in New York, raises questions about the effects of an 
entrepreneurial first generation for the educational, occupational and economic mobility of the 
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second-generation. Unlike other Asian-origin groups, the Koreans are primarily Protestants, and 
have established thousands of immigrant churches (mostly Presbyterian) throughout the United 
States. 
Mode III (preponderantly admitted with refugee status, mixed human capital profile): 
The Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians stand in sharp contrast: they are state-sponsored 
groups who entered the U.S. as part of the largest refugee resettlement program in the country’s 
history, whose incorporation was assisted by a wide range of cash and non-cash public aid 
programs made available to them upon arrival and thereafter on the same basis as U.S.-citizens 
(unlike other immigrant groups), but yet arrived often destitute in the aftermath of the Indochina 
War, and (especially among the survivors of Cambodia’s “killing fields”) with chronic mental 
health problems. The poverty rates for the majority of the Vietnamese (those who came after 
1975) remain higher than the national norm; and the rates for the Cambodians and Laotians 
(especially the Hmong) have been the highest in the U.S. (Hein 2006; Rumbaut 2005a).  
Given these pronounced differences in migration histories, human capital, family backgrounds, and 
contexts of exit and of reception in the United States among these groups, we can hypothesize possible 
mobility trajectories for their 1.5- and 2nd-generation adult children as they acculturate and make their 
way in the Southern California region. However, since we cannot ascertain those mobility outcomes 
intergenerationally with available official statistics, we turn to two specialized surveys, IIMMLA and 
CILS. 
Data and Measures: The CILS-III and IIMMLA Surveys in Southern California 
Data for the analysis that follows is drawn from two sources: the third wave of the Children of 
Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS) in San Diego, a decade-long panel study whose last phase of 
data collection ended in 2003; and the Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan 
Los Angeles (IIMMLA) survey, a cross-sectional study whose data collection was carried out in 2004. 
Both surveys were conducted in Southern California, a region adjacent to the Mexican border that has 
been the nation’s largest net receiver of immigrants. By the year 2000 one of every five immigrants in 
the United States resided in the region’s six contiguous counties (San Diego, Orange, Los Angeles, 
Ventura, Riverside and San Bernardino), including the largest communities of Mexicans, Salvadorans, 
Guatemalans, Filipinos, Taiwanese, Koreans, Vietnamese, and Cambodians outside of their countries 
of origin.  
For purposes of this analysis the two data sets were merged (increasing sample size to N=6,135), since 
they are based on representative samples of respondents evenly divided by gender, of the same 
approximate age (28.6 years for IIMMLA respondents and 24.2 years for CILS) and national origins 
(Mexicans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Filipinos, Chinese, Koreans, Vietnamese, Cambodians and 
Laotians make up 76% of the merged sample, and other Latin American and Asian nationalities 10%), 
who were surveyed at about the same time (IIMMLA in 2004, CILS-III in 2001-2003) in the same 
metropolitan region (the six contiguous Southern California counties). In IIMMLA and CILS-III the 
focus was on patterns of adaptation of adult children of contemporary immigrants—both those who 
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were born abroad but arrived in the U.S. as children (the 1.5 generation), and those who were born in 
the U.S. of immigrant parents (the second generation); both surveys used identical measures of 
relevant variables. Merging the two data sets yields larger sample sizes for significant subgroups and 
greater precision and reliability for estimates of mobility outcomes by group and generation. (A 
detailed description of the sampling and research design of each study is attached in the Appendix.) 
Table 3 shows the number of IIMMLA and CILS respondents by gender, age group (20-24, 25 and 
older), and generational cohort (1.5, 2nd, 3rd and higher) for the main ethnic groups used in this 
analysis (which may also be seen as proxies for different modes of incorporation). Overall, their mean 
age was 27.5. Of the 6,135 respondents in the merged sample, 80% were 1.5 (n=2,356) or 2nd 
generation (n=2,566), and 20% were 3rd or higher generations (n=1,213). Among the 1.5 and 2nd 
generations (n=4,922), Mode I groups (Mexicans, Salvadorans and Guatemalans) accounted for 1,621; 
Mode II groups (Filipinos, Chinese [including Taiwanese] and Koreans) numbered 1,824; and Mode 
III groups (from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) totaled 790. The “Other Latin Americans” (n=240) 
came from all of the other Spanish-speaking countries of Central and South America and the 
Caribbean, while “all other nationalities” (n=447) included respondents from Canada and dozens of 
countries from Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and the non-Spanish Caribbean. For all groups except 
Mexicans and non-Hispanic whites and blacks, immigration is so recent that sampling was not feasible 
beyond the second generation. (Indeed, for those groups without exception, more than 70% of their 
total population in the U.S. is foreign-born, and of the remainder nearly all belong to the U.S.-born 
second generation. For those groups and their descendants in Southern California, members of the 
fourth generation have not yet been born and members of the third generation are small in number and 
still in infancy or childhood.) Of the 2,566 born in the U.S. and classified as second generation, 76% 
had two foreign-born parents (the “2.0” cohort), while 24% had one U.S.-born parent (the "2.5" 
cohort). Of the 1,213 respondents classified as third or higher generations (U.S.-born persons with two 
U.S.-born parents), half of the Mexican Americans (47%) had four U.S.-born grandparents ("4th+" 
generation), as did two thirds (69%) of the non-Hispanic whites, and almost all (95%) of the black 
respondents. 
Results from the merged sample are presented as follows. Tables 4, 5 and 6 focus first on antecedent 
variables hypothesized to have significant effects on the young adult respondents’ educational 
attainment: parental human capital (the educational attainment of father and mother), parental 
citizenship status and acculturation (years in the U.S., English fluency), and—during the respondents’ 
childhood and adolescent years—family structure, parental homeownership, and neighborhood 
contexts. Tables 7, 8 and 9 present a series of intervening and outcome variables—respondents’ 
linguistic acculturation, incarceration and early childbearing histories, and early educational 
achievement (high school grades)—and highest level of education attained in early adulthood. Table 
10 then analyzes the extent of intergenerational educational mobility, comparing the educational 
attainment of sons and daughters vs. fathers and mothers. Finally, multivariate analyses are presented 
regressing years of education on selected predictors controlling for all of the preceding, to identify the 
most significant determinants.
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Table 3. 
Young Adults in Southern California: Sample Size by Ethnicity, Gender, Generation, and Age   
(Merged IIMMLA and CILS-III San Diego Samples,  N=6,135) 
                          
 Total   Gender   Generational Cohort1  Age 
  N   Female Male   1.5 2nd 3rd+   20-24 25 and older Mean age 
            
(years) 
Panethnicity             
Hispanic 2,262  1,181 1,081  695 1,166 401  912 1,350 27.5 
Asian 2,743  1,382 1,361  1,569 1,174 0  1,441 1,302 26.2 
Black 432  239 193  11 24 397  104 328 30.5 
White 698  362 336  81 202 415  172 526 30.3 
             
Ethnicity             
Mexican 1,642  855 787  423 818 401  680 962 27.5 
Salvadoran, Guatemalan 380  193 187  181 199 0  155 225 26.8 
Other Latin American2 240  133 107  91 149 0  77 163 28.6 
Filipino 983  508 475  411 572 0  586 397 25.5 
Chinese 433  188 245  235 198 0  184 249 27.6 
Korean 408  207 201  257 151 0  164 244 27.6 
Vietnamese 590  296 294  434 156 0  320 270 26.0 
Cambodian, Laotian 200  112 88  191 9 0  119 81 24.5 
All other nationalities3 447  247 200  133 314 0  166 281 28.8 
                          
Total 6,135   3,164 2,971   2,356 2,566 1,213   2,629 3,506 27.5 
             
Source:  Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA) survey;  Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS-III), San 
Diego. 1
  Generational cohorts defined as follows: 1.5 = foreign born, but arrived in U.S. in childhood; 2nd = U.S.-born, one or both parents foreign-born;  
    3rd or higher = U.S.-born, both parents U.S.-born.  Among the 2,566 classified as 2nd generation, 659 had one U.S.-born parent ("2.5" generation). 
    Among the 1,213 classified as 3rd or higher generation, half of the Mexican Americans (47%) had four U.S.-born grandparents ("4th+" 
generation),  
 
    as did two thirds (69%) of the non-Hispanic white respondents, and almost all (95%) of the black 
respondents. 
    
2  "Other Latin Americans" include respondents from all other Spanish-speaking countries of Central and South America and the Caribbean. 
3
  "All other nationalities" include respondents from Canada (42), and dozens of European, Middle Eastern, Afro-Caribbean and other Asian countries. 
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Table 4. 
Parental Human Capital: Educational Attainment of Father and Mother, by Ethnicity and Generation 
(Merged IIMMLA and CILS-III San Diego Samples) 
                       
 Parents' Educational Attainment  Father   Mother 
(In percents) Neither finished Only one is Both finished Only one is  Both are   Less than  College  Less than  College 
  
high school hi school grad high school college grad college grads 
 
high school graduate  high school graduate 
            
Panethnicity            
Hispanic 40.0 26.9 21.8 7.3 3.9  53.3 10.7  53.6 8.4 
Asian 16.8 14.7 22.9 19.7 26.0  21.8 41.7  26.5 35.4 
(3rd+ gen.) Black 10.8 22.2 37.5 17.9 11.6  28.9 21.1  14.4 25.9 
(3rd+ gen.) White 4.3 12.0 35.4 22.7 25.5  15.2 40.5  11.2 33.5 
            
Ethnicity            
(1.5 gen.) Mexican 70.4 19.9 6.6 2.1 0.9  78.5 5.2  82.3 1.7 
(2nd gen.) Mexican 44.0 29.3 20.0 4.3 2.3  58.7 6.2  58.7 5.9 
(3rd+ gen.) Mexican 16.0 24.2 43.4 11.2 5.2  27.9 12.7  28.2 10.5 
            
Salvadoran, Guatemalan 38.7 34.5 16.8 8.2 1.8  56.6 11.1  55.3 7.9 
Other Latin American 15.0 23.8 26.7 18.8 15.8  27.9 31.3  25.8 26.7 
Filipino 5.6 14.5 24.4 24.6 30.8  11.9 43.7  13.8 49.8 
Chinese 11.8 12.9 21.5 19.6 34.2  16.2 55.4  20.3 38.1 
Korean 6.1 9.1 22.3 22.5 40.0  8.8 60.3  12.5 44.6 
Vietnamese 30.8 20.2 25.4 13.6 10.0  36.4 24.7  45.4 13.4 
Cambodian, Laotian 67.5 15.5 10.0 3.5 3.5  69.5 9.5  81.0 5.5 
All other nationalities 8.5 17.2 28.2 25.3 20.8  19.5 39.8  14.8 32.2 
                        
Total 23.7 19.7 24.6 15.5 16.5   33.2 28.7   33.9 24.6 
            
Source:  IIMMLA survey;  CILS-III, San Diego.          
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Unequal Origins 
Parental human capital. Table 4 presents data on parental human capital for the main ethnic groups, 
comparing their father’s and mother’s levels of completed education (including the proportion who 
had not graduated from high school, and who had graduated with a four-year college degree or more). 
Data for the larger Mexican-origin sample permit a breakdown between the 1.5, 2nd and 3rd+ 
generations. Reflecting the national data presented earlier, there are very sharp ethnic differences 
between the Mexican, Salvadoran, Guatemalan, Cambodian and Laotian immigrant parents at one pole 
(between 55% and 82% of whose fathers and mothers had less than a high school education, while the 
proportions with college degrees were in the single digits), and the Chinese and Koreans at the other 
(more than half of the fathers and about 40% of the mothers had college degrees). In between these 
poles were all the other groups. Significantly greater proportions of Vietnamese fathers and mothers 
had less than a high school education, while significantly greater proportions of Filipino fathers and 
mothers had college degrees. Non-Hispanic whites (mostly 3rd and higher generation natives, who may 
serve as a reference group in this analysis) were in the middle, with 40% of fathers and 33% of 
mothers having college degrees (11-15% were high school dropouts). Among non-Hispanic blacks, the 
mothers (26% college grads, 14% high school dropouts) were notably more educated than the fathers 
(21% college grads, 29% high school dropouts). 
The multigenerational Mexican sample reveals sharp within-group differences in the educational 
attainments of the parents of the 1.5, 2nd and 3rd+ generations. Thus, among the 1.5-generation adult 
respondents (who came to the U.S. from Mexico as children), over 70% of both their fathers and 
mothers had less than a high school education, while scarcely 1% had completed a college degree. By 
contrast, 44% of both parents of 2nd-generation respondents had less than a high school education and 
2.3% had a college degree; and among the parents of the 3rd+ generations, only 16% of both fathers 
and mothers were high school dropouts, while 5.2% had college degrees. These data suggest that the 
parents of the U.S.-born 2nd generation were more likely than the parents of the 1.5ers to have come to 
the U.S. as children (i.e., as 1.5ers themselves), and thus to be more acculturated and to have 
completed their educations in the U.S.—another reason for distinguishing the 1.5- from the 2nd-
generations analytically, rather than lumping these cohorts into a de facto “second generation” 
(Rumbaut 2004).  
Parental acculturation and citizenship. Differences in their immigrant parents’ citizenship status, 
length of time in the U.S., and English-language ability are made clear by the data provided in Table 5. 
Again the results are broken down by ethnicity, but now only for immigrant parents (i.e., the parents 
of 3rd+ generations are excluded). The immigrant parents in this Southern California sample are not 
recent arrivals: they had resided in the U.S. for an average of 26 years (over 95% had been in the U.S. 
for more than 10 years, and 75% for more than 20 years). But in all of the measures shown in Table 5, 
there are very significant differences for virtually all of the nationalities between the parents whose 
children were foreign-born (1.5ers) and those whose children were born in the U.S. (2nd generation). 
The parents of the latter had resided in the U.S. for over 31 years, while the parents of the 1.5ers had 
been in the U.S. for nearly 21 years—a difference of a decade, generally observable among all the 
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ethnic groups. Partly as a result, the immigrant mothers and fathers of the 2nd-generation were more 
than twice as likely to speak English “very well” (about 40% do) than the parents of the 1.5ers (less 
than 20%). When it comes to English fluency, Filipino parents—coming from a country where English 
is one of two official languages—are far more likely to speak it “very well” than any other nationality 
by far (nearly two-thirds do). Similarly, Filipino parents, followed closely by the Vietnamese, are most 
likely to have become naturalized U.S. citizens (a minimum of five years of prior legal permanent 
residency in the U.S. is a precondition for naturalization). Indeed, with the notable exception of the 
Cambodians and Laotians, over 90% of the parents of all 2nd-generation Asian-origin groups had 
become U.S. citizens. That contrasts sharply with the proportions of Mexican, Salvadoran and 
Guatemalan fathers and mothers: nearly two-thirds of those with foreign-born (1.5-generation) 
offspring were not U.S. citizens, and neither were a quarter to a third of those with U.S.-born (2nd-
generation) offspring, despite their extended length of residence in the country (which encompassed 
the period of the IRCA amnesty in the late 1980s, for which it is likely that many formerly 
undocumented Mexican parents qualified if they entered the U.S. prior to 1982). 
Family and neighborhood contexts growing up. From prior research we know that in addition to 
parental human capital and mode of incorporation, other factors—particularly family structure and 
marital stability, financial and residential stability, and residential neighborhood contexts in childhood 
and adolescence—can shape educational and socioeconomic trajectories in early adulthood (see 
Attewell and Lavin, 2007:126-153; Kasinitz et al, 2008:94-132; McLanahan and Sandefur, 1994; cf. 
Bowles et al., 2005). The data in Table 6 show the percent of respondents, by ethnicity and 
panethnicity, who grew up in families with both natural parents present, in homes that were owned 
(not rented) by their parents, and in neighborhoods that experienced to varying degrees major 
problems with crime, drugs and gangs (as measured by a summed index of perceived neighborhood 
problems). These latter are correlated in turn with the degree of poverty and racial segregation in an 
area, and with the quality of neighborhood schools, congealing into structures of cumulating 
advantages or disadvantages. Striking differences are seen by ethnicity and panethnicity among all of 
these factors, as well as by generational cohorts within the Mexican-origin group. 
First, with respect to family structure, Asian-origin respondents were almost twice as likely as native 
blacks (82% to 45%) to grow up in families with both birth parents present, with Hispanics (65%) and 
native whites (56%) in between. Among Asians, the proportions were above 80% for all groups except 
the poorest, the Cambodians and Laotians, only two-thirds of whom (65%) were raised in intact 
families (in many cases as a result of the death of a parent, as seen in the disproportionate number of 
Cambodian widows resettled as refugees in the 1980s). Among Mexican Americans, the 1.5 
generation was most likely to be raised by both parents (72%), declining to 67% in the 2nd generation 
(with more acculturated parents) and 57% among the 3rd+ generations. Those generational shifts in 
family structure—with foreign-parentage families more likely to remain intact, and native-parentage 
families more likely to break up, primarily as a result of divorce—have been repeatedly observed in 
U.S. census data and national-level surveys (see, e.g., Landale et al., 2006). 
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Table 5. 
Parental Status and Acculturation: Citizenship, Years in the United States, and English Fluency 
(Merged IIMMLA and CILS-III San Diego Samples) 
                            
  Father's Citizenship Status   Mother's Citizenship Status  Parents'   Speaks English  
Ethnicity and Generation Born in  Naturalized Not a U.S.  Born in  Naturalized Not a U.S.  years in   "Very Well" 
  
  U.S. citizen citizen  U.S. citizen citizen  U.S.  Father Mother  
              
Mexican 1.5 2.8 35.5 61.7  1.2 37.4 61.5  21.3  9.0 4.9 
 2nd 14.1 61.1 24.8  15.3 64.5 20.2  31.9  24.6 20.2 
Salvadoran, Guatemalan 1.5 2.2 30.9 66.9  0.0 43.6 56.4  22.5  13.4 8.9 
 2nd 5.5 61.8 32.7  3.0 72.9 24.1  29.4  34.2 21.1 
Other Latin American 1.5 2.2 50.5 47.3  0.0 54.9 45.1  22.8  25.3 17.7 
 2nd 17.4 61.7 20.8  20.1 71.8 8.1  34.6  58.5 52.6 
Filipino 1.5 2.2 76.9 20.9  0.0 82.7 17.3  20.2  56.5 56.5 
 2nd 16.4 80.2 3.3  5.6 90.7 3.7  28.6  64.6 66.6 
Chinese 1.5 0.9 66.4 32.8  0.4 76.6 23.0  18.8  11.5 8.4 
 2nd 8.1 84.8 7.1  6.1 87.4 6.6  32.1  42.8 38.1 
Korean 1.5 1.9 59.9 38.1  0.8 64.2 35.0  21.6  12.9 2.7 
 2nd 9.3 74.2 16.6  2.6 87.4 9.9  29.5  35.4 25.7 
Vietnamese 1.5 0.9 80.9 18.2  0.2 81.6 18.2  19.6  8.6 5.9 
 2nd 3.8 90.4 5.8  1.3 91.0 7.7  25.5  20.8 16.0 
Cambodian, Laotian 1.5 0.0 46.6 53.4  0.0 46.6 53.4  19.7  3.3 3.3 
 2nd 0.0 75.0 25.0  0.0 68.9 31.1  23.0  33.3 22.2 
All other nationalities 1.5 7.5 61.7 30.8  2.3 70.7 27.1  23.9  49.6 48.0 
 2nd 25.5 61.8 12.7  25.5 60.5 14.0  37.1  59.9 59.9 
                         
Total 1.5 2.0 59.4 38.5  0.5 64.0 35.4  20.7  19.3 15.8 
  
2nd 14.1 70.1 15.8   11.3 75.8 12.9   31.2   41.5 37.5 
              
Source:  IIMMLA survey;  CILS-III, San 
Diego. 
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Table 6. 
Growing Up: Family Structure, Parental Homeownership, and Neighborhood Contexts 
(Merged IIMMLA and CILS-III San Diego Samples) 
                
 Family Structure   Family Home  Neighborhood Problems with Crime, Drugs, Gangs 
(In percents) Intact family1  Parents  (based on summed index of neighborhood problems) 
  
(both parents present)   owned home 
 
No problems Some problems Big problems 
        
Panethnicity        
Hispanic 65.1  57.1  32.6 39.7 27.7 
Asian 81.9  69.9  55.2 36.6 8.3 
(3rd+ gen.) Black 44.6  65.5  30.2 42.8 27.0 
(3rd+ gen.) White 56.1  86.3  55.9 36.4 7.7 
        
Ethnicity        
(1.5 gen.) Mexican 71.9  35.2  30.1 34.4 35.5 
(2nd gen.) Mexican 66.9  62.3  34.0 38.7 27.3 
(3rd+ gen.) Mexican 57.4  71.8  36.2 43.1 20.7 
        
Salvadoran, Guatemalan 64.7  50.5  24.3 42.0 33.8 
Other Latin American 60.4  63.8  39.9 41.7 18.4 
Filipino 81.2  81.6  55.1 36.4 8.5 
Chinese 85.9  85.0  58.3 36.0 5.7 
Korean 87.0  77.2  58.3 36.0 5.8 
Vietnamese 82.2  50.7  50.1 40.0 9.9 
Cambodian, Laotian 65.0  17.5  54.3 34.0 11.7 
All other nationalities 71.6  79.0  54.8 34.8 10.4 
                
Total 70.8   66.5   44.9 38.2 16.9 
        
Source:  IIMMLA survey;  CILS-III, San Diego.       
1
 "Intact family:" grew up in 2-parent family; "non-intact:" parents divorced, separated, died or remarried during childhood or adolescence. 
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With respect to parental homeownership, and the relative financial and residential stability it implies 
(compared to renters), by far the highest proportions were reported for native-parentage whites (86%), 
followed by Asians (70%), blacks (65%) and Hispanics (57%). However, among Asian groups there 
were huge differences between the Chinese, Filipinos and Koreans (with homeownership rates ranging 
from 77% to 85%), the Vietnamese (51%), and the Cambodians and Laotians (at 17% by far the 
lowest of any group, reflecting the dismal economic situation of these refugee parents in the 1980s and 
1990s). Among Mexican Americans too, there were large within-group differences by generation: the 
1.5 generation was least likely to be raised in homes owned by their parents (35%), compared to 62% 
in the 2nd generation and 72% in the 3rd+ generations. Those homeownership patterns are the opposite 
of the patterns in family structure noted above: i.e., over time and generation in the U.S., 
homeownership and financial stability increase while intact family structures and marital stability 
decrease.  
Among the groups in our Southern California sample, very large differences were also observed in the 
risk of growing up in crime-ridden dangerous neighborhoods. More than a fourth of Hispanics (28%) 
and blacks (27%) reported that crime, drugs and gangs were “big problems” in the neighborhoods 
where they were raised, while the comparative proportion among Asians and whites was in the single 
digits, as Table 6 shows. By contrast, more than a half of whites (56%) and Asians (55%) reported 
growing up in safe neighborhoods where crime, drugs and gangs were not a problem, compared to less 
than a third of Hispanics and blacks. The proportions among the Asian groups applied across all 
national-origin groups, including the Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians. Among Mexican 
Americans, neighborhood contexts became relatively safer over generation in the U.S., with 36% of 
the 1.5 generation reporting “big problems” with crime, drugs and gangs in their neighborhoods 
growing up, dropping to 27% in the 2nd and 21% in the 3rd+ generations—paralleling, albeit to a lesser 
extent, the residential mobility observed in the parents’ growing rates of intergenerational 
homeownership. 
Unequal Outcomes 
Linguistic acculturation. Having examined a range of antecedent factors hypothesized to shape social 
and economic outcomes of children of immigrants in early adulthood, we begin the analysis of 
outcomes by focusing first on their patterns of linguistic acculturation. In the United States, English 
proficiency has always been a key to socioeconomic mobility for immigrants and their children and to 
their full participation in their adoptive society. Indeed, immigrants and their children know that better 
than anyone else. Still, alarms are often raised in nativist political discourse and in the popular and 
even academic literature (e.g., Huntington 2004) about the proliferation of foreign languages and the 
potential threat this may pose to English dominance—with particular concern about the Spanish 
language: after all, the 2000 census counted over 28 million people who spoke Spanish at home, by far 
the largest language minority in the country (Portes and Rumbaut, 2006).  
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Table 7. 
Adult Children's Linguistic Acculturation: Language Used at Home Growing Up,  
  and Current Language Preference and Proficiency 
(Merged IIMMLA and CILS-III San Diego Samples) 
                  
  Growing up, % 
  
Currently, %  Current non-English language proficiency 
Ethnicity and Generation1 spoke non-English  prefers to speak  % can speak it  % can read it 
  
  language at home   English at home  "very well"   "very well" 
         
Mexican 1.5 96.7  33.6  59.3  64.3 
 2.0 96.5  49.7  60.0  51.0 
 2.5 81.3  76.3  34.6  27.9 
 3rd+ 26.4  96.0  7.5  5.5 
Salvadoran, Guatemalan 1.5 96.7  44.2  64.6  62.4 
 2.0 95.6  56.0  58.8  47.8 
 2.5 58.8  76.5  29.4  23.5 
Other Latin American 1.5 97.8  49.5  75.8  63.7 
 2.0 91.4  71.0  48.4  39.8 
 2.5 60.7  96.4  12.5  12.5 
Filipino 1.5 88.6  80.8  27.3  23.1 
 2.0 73.8  93.9  6.5  4.9 
 2.5 61.1  96.8  0.8  1.6 
Chinese 1.5 96.2  40.0  50.6  29.8 
 2.0 93.5  71.8  22.4  4.7 
 2.5 42.9  100.0  3.6  0.0 
Korean 1.5 95.7  57.6  40.9  30.0 
 2.0 85.0  71.4  16.5  8.3 
 2.5 27.8  94.4  5.6  5.6 
Vietnamese 1.5 97.5  47.0  40.3  19.4 
 2.0 93.9  70.3  16.2  2.0 
 2.5 75.0  87.5  0.0  0.0 
Cambodian, Laotian 1.5 99.5  45.0  51.8  8.4 
 2.0 99.5  55.6  44.4  11.1 
 2.5 NA  NA  NA  NA 
All other nationalities 1.5 72.2  78.2  38.3  16.5 
 2.0 67.9  85.3  20.5  13.5 
 2.5 25.6  98.1  3.2  3.2 
                 
Total by Generation: 1.5 94.1  52.4  46.6  34.3 
 2.0 87.3  69.6  33.8  25.3 
 2.5 58.4  88.9  15.9  13.3 
  3rd+ 13.7   98.4   2.8   2.6 
         
Source:  IIMMLA survey;  CILS-III, San Diego.       
1
  Generational cohorts defined as follows: 1.5 = foreign born, but arrived in U.S. in childhood; 2.0 =   
    born; 2.5 = U.S.-born, one parent foreign-born, one parent U.S.-born; 3rd or higher = U.S.-born, both parents U.S.-born.   
 
Table 7 summarizes the relevant survey evidence on linguistic acculturation for our sample—
comparing the percent that grew up speaking a non-English language at home vs. their current 
language preferences and level of proficiency in the non-English language. The data are broken down 
by ethnicity and more detailed generational cohorts: in addition to the 1.5 and 3rd and beyond 
generations, the U.S.-born second generation is divided here into those with two foreign-born parents 
(“2.0”), and those with one foreign-born and one U.S.-born parent (“2.5”). Overall, among foreign-
parentage respondents, 94% of the 1.5ers and 87% of the “2.0” cohort grew up speaking a language 
other than English at home (somewhat less among the Filipinos)—but the proportion dropped to 58% 
among the 2.5ers, suggesting how rapidly English can become the sole language in homes where one 
parent is U.S.-born. By the 3rd+ generations, only 14% reported speaking a language other than 
English at home growing up. By contrast, those proportions are reversed by examining their actual 
language preferences in adulthood: overall, more than half of the foreign-born 1.5ers (52%) now 
prefer to speak English only at home, as do more than two thirds of the “2.0” (70%), 89% of the 
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2.5ers, and 98% of the 3rd+. That rapid language switch to English is accompanied by the rapid 
atrophy of our respondents’ spoken and reading abilities in their non-English mother tongue over time 
and generation in the U.S. Among the 1.5ers, less than half (47%) could speak the non-English 
language “very well,” and only a third could read it “very well” (34%); by the 2.0 generation only a 
third (34%) could speak the non-English language “very well,” and only a quarter could read it “very 
well” (25%); among the 2.5ers those proportions decreased more sharply still to 16% and 13%, 
respectively; and the 3rd+ generations had become largely English monolinguals (less than 3% had 
either speaking or reading fluency in the non-English language). 
These patterns hold without exception across all of the ethnic groups, and demonstrate the “straight 
line” rapidity with which English is acquired and comes to be preferred by immigrants who arrive at a 
young age and by the U.S.-born children and grandchildren of immigrants. However, as Table 7 
documents, all of the Asian-origin groups are much more likely than all of the Spanish-speakers to 
lose bilingual skills (especially literacy skills) by the second generation, and to effectively to become 
English monolinguals among the 2.5ers. Thus, among those of Mexican descent, between half and two 
thirds of the 1.5 and 2.0 cohorts can still speak and read Spanish very well, but those proportions fall 
to between a quarter and a third in the 2.5 cohort, and decrease to single digits by the 3rd+. (For 
comparative data on Spanish language retention across four to five generations of Mexican Americans 
in Los Angeles and San Antonio, see Telles and Ortiz, 2008.) Indeed, in a recent study of “linguistic 
life expectancies,” also using the merged CILS-III and IIMMLA data sets, we estimated the average 
number of generations a mother tongue can be expected to survive after the arrival of an immigrant in 
Southern California—home for the nation’s largest concentration of immigrants, including Spanish-
speakers. The analysis showed that even among those of Mexican origin, the Spanish language “died” 
by the third generation; all other languages “died” between the second and third generations (Rumbaut 
et al., 2006).  
Indicators of “downward assimilation.” If English proficiency is a correlate of upward educational and 
economic mobility in early adulthood, other life events and experiences can function as negative 
turning points to detour or derail such socioeconomic trajectories—especially, as noted earlier, 
entanglements with the criminal justice system and premature childbearing. Table 8 presents results by 
ethnicity, generation and gender of four such indicators of “downward assimilation:” among the men, 
whether they had ever been arrested or incarcerated (which in most cases involved being convicted 
and sentenced for the commission of a crime); and among the women, whether they had borne 
children out of wedlock or had been teen parents (had a child between the ages of 14 and 20). There 
are striking differences in each of these indicators between ethnic groups and generational cohorts. 
Among the nearly 3,000 men in this Southern California sample (whose mean age was 27.5), the rates 
of arrest and incarceration were highest by far for blacks (almost all of whom were 4th+ generation 
African Americans), and lowest for Asians, with whites and Hispanics in between. Among native-
stock blacks, fully 40% had been arrested at some point by the police and 27% had been incarcerated; 
among both native-stock whites and Hispanics, 29% had ever been arrested and 18% incarcerated; and 
among Asians, the respective figures were 10% and 6%. Intergenerational differences are strongly 
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significant overall, with the U.S.-born (second and 3rd+ generations) much more likely to become 
ensnared with the criminal justice system than the foreign-born (the 1.5 generation), reflecting the 
national patterns noted earlier among young adult men 18 to 34 (cf. Rumbaut 2005b; Rumbaut and 
Ewing 2007). The patterns are linear, but with the outcomes worsening over time and generation—and 
acculturation—in the United States: among the 1.5ers, 13% had ever been arrested and 8% 
incarcerated, compared to 21% and 12% respectively in the second generation, and 36% and 24% in 
the 3rd+ generations.  
Table 8. 
Turning Points in Social Mobility among Young Adults:  
Arrest and Incarceration (men) and Early Childbearing (women) 
(Merged IIMMLA and CILS-III San Diego Samples: N=2,971 males, 3,164 females) 
              
  Criminal Justice (males only)   Childbearing (females only) 
Ethnicity and Generation % ever % ever   % teenage % non-marital 
  
  arrested incarcerated  childbearing childbearing 
       
Panethnicity:       
Hispanic 1.5-3rd+ 29.0 18.1  28.1 18.0 
Asian 1.5-2nd 10.4 5.7  7.7 5.6 
Black 3rd+ 40.4 27.3  28.0 32.2 
White 3rd+ 29.4 18.1  14.2 11.8 
       
Ethnicity:       
Mexican 1.5 22.3 11.9  31.2 19.9 
 2nd 29.8 20.4  30.1 16.7 
 3rd+ 39.6 26.6  29.2 18.2 
Salvadoran, Guatemalan 1.5 21.3 11.2  33.7 19.6 
 2nd 36.7 17.3  27.7 24.8 
Other Latin American 1.5 17.4 15.2  8.9 11.1 
 2nd 21.3 11.5  12.5 13.6 
Filipino 1.5 13.3 8.2  9.7 6.9 
 2nd 9.6 5.7  11.6 9.9 
Chinese 1.5 5.8 2.9  0.0 4.1 
 2nd 7.4 1.9  0.0 3.3 
Korean 1.5 11.6 3.9  0.8 0.6 
 2nd 18.1 2.8  8.9 2.5 
Vietnamese 1.5 8.1 5.8  3.3 3.3 
 2nd 12.7 9.9  8.2 3.5 
Cambodian, Laotian 1.5 8.4 8.4  21.3 10.2 
 2nd 20.0 20.0  NA NA 
All other nationalities 1.5 12.3 7.0  6.6 5.3 
 2nd 21.7 11.9  11.7 9.4 
             
Total by Generation: 1.5 13.2 7.8  13.5 9.0 
 
2nd 20.7 12.1  17.6 12.1 
  
3rd+ 36.3 23.8   23.8 20.8 
       
Source:  IIMMLA survey;  CILS-III, San Diego.     
       
Indeed, the rates for all of the immigrants and U.S.-born children of immigrants in this sample are 
lower than the rates for native-stock whites (see Kasinitz et al., 2008:188, for parallel results in New 
York City, where rates of arrest and incarceration for a similarly aged sample of native-stock white 
men were 23% and 10%, and for black men 33% and 16%, while those for 1.5- and 2nd-generation 
Chinese were in the single digits and other immigrant-stock groups fell in between). For the large 
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Mexican-origin subsample, the intergenerational patterns are clear: among the Mexican-born 1.5ers, 
22% had ever been arrested and 12% incarcerated, compared to 30% and 20% respectively in the 
second generation, and almost 40% and 27% in the 3rd+. The latter figures are identical to those for 
African American men—the highest observed in this sample, as well as nationally. Given the huge 
size of the Mexican-origin first and second generations compared to other groups in the United States, 
this is a finding fraught with implications for the future—not only for the downward mobility 
prospects of the men caught in a cycle of arrest and imprisonment (who typically have high rates of 
recidivism after release), but also for both the short-term and long-term effects on their ethnic 
communities. 
Of the 3,164 women in this sample (whose mean age was 27.4), 44% had borne one or more children; 
half (52%) were single and a third were married (33%), with the remainder cohabiting or divorced 
(7% each). Rates of non-marital and teenage childbearing were highest for African Americans—32% 
and 28%, respectively. Among Hispanics, 18% reported unmarried births, but an equally high 28% 
had become teen parents. The rates for whites—12% and 14%—were about half those of Hispanics; 
while the rates for Asians—6% and 8%—were half those of whites and the lowest overall. Again, 
intergenerational differences are significant overall, with the U.S.-born (second and 3rd+ generations) 
more likely to become unmarried or teen parents than the foreign-born (the 1.5 generation). Among 
the 1.5ers, only 9% had a child out of wedlock and 13% by or before age 20; in the second generation 
those rates increased to 12% and 18% respectively, and in the 3rd+ to 21% and 24%. The Mexicans, 
Salvadorans and Guatemalans were much more likely to have children, and to have had children 
between the ages of 14 and 20; for them, those rates (especially of teen births) were very high 
irrespective of generational status, and that extended into the 3rd+ generations among Mexican-descent 
women. The Chinese, Koreans and Vietnamese were least likely to have children, or to have become 
unmarried or teen parents (indeed, not a single Chinese woman had a teen birth). Filipinas and non-
Hispanic white women were in between in these indicators. Their effects on educational attainment 
and ethnic inequality will be examined below.  
Educational Achievement. Education, and particularly the attainment of a college degree, increasingly 
determines the occupational and economic opportunities and payoffs available to young adults in the 
U.S., and hence their prospects for upward (or downward) mobility in relation both to their peers and 
to their parents. Access to and success in higher education, in turn, is shaped by a complex of factors, 
including all of those examined above—as well as by early school achievement. Table 9 presents two 
measures of educational attainment, broken down by ethnicity (and generational cohort for those of 
Mexican descent): their average grades in high school3 (during adolescence); and their highest level of 
education attained (in adulthood). The latter specify the proportion that dropped out of high school, 
 
 
3
 High school grades were measured for CILS-San Diego respondents by official academic grade point averages calculated by the school 
district at the end of high school, on a 4-point scale (where A=4). IIMMLA respondents provided self-reports of high school GPAs. The 
measures were recoded so that “mostly As”=GPAs above 3.5, “mostly Bs”=2.5 to 3.5, “mostly C’s”=1.5 to 2.5, and “mostly Ds, Fs”=GPAs 
below 1.5. 
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Table 9. 
Educational Attainment: Early Achievement (High School Grades) and Highest Education Attained, by Ethnicity and Generation 
(Merged IIMMLA and CILS-III San Diego Samples) 
                      
 High School Grades  Highest Educational Attainment1 
(In percents) Mostly Mostly Mostly Mostly  High school High school Some Bachelor's Advanced 
  
Ds, Fs Cs Bs As  dropout graduate college degree degree 
        
 (25 and older) (25 and older) 
Panethnicity           
Hispanic 10.2 29.6 45.0 15.3  17.6 25.3 41.0 14.1 7.2 
Asian 5.2 11.4 43.0 40.4  2.7 11.0 42.6 40.9 18.0 
(3rd+ gen.) Black 2.5 34.0 50.6 12.8  15.4 19.6 44.6 17.9 6.2 
(3rd+ gen.) White 3.1 20.0 46.0 30.8  9.4 14.9 32.8 31.3 17.5 
           
Ethnicity           
(1.5 gen.) Mexican 17.5 26.0 44.2 12.3  29.6 26.5 32.6 10.3 4.4 
(2nd gen.) Mexican 13.6 31.9 41.3 13.2  15.0 28.9 42.2 11.7 7.7 
(3rd+ gen.) Mexican 4.0 34.9 44.1 17.0  18.5 26.4 38.4 13.7 5.8 
           
Salvadoran, Guatemalan 4.2 27.9 53.2 14.7  15.5 21.6 46.6 16.9 7.1 
Other Latin American 5.4 21.7 47.1 25.8  7.1 15.0 47.1 23.3 12.9 
Filipino 7.5 15.3 45.1 32.1  2.3 11.8 52.9 33.2 9.8 
Chinese 1.8 7.4 39.5 51.3  0.7 5.3 30.9 49.0 33.3 
Korean 1.7 8.1 40.2 50.0  2.2 6.6 31.6 50.8 26.6 
Vietnamese 3.7 8.6 42.2 45.4  2.7 7.8 43.7 44.4 14.1 
Cambodian, Laotian 13.5 16.0 50.5 20.0  6.5 40.0 39.0 12.3 3.7 
All other nationalities 2.5 17.0 45.9 34.7  6.5 13.2 38.5 27.0 19.6 
           
Total 6.6 20.6 44.7 28.2   9.6 17.3 41.3 26.6 13.0 
           
Source:  IIMMLA survey;  CILS-III, San Diego.         
1
  Educational attainment for Bachelor's or advanced degrees is reported only for 
respondents 25 or older.  
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those who graduated from high school but went no further in their education, those who had some 
college but did not complete a “4-year” degree, and (for those 25 and older) those who earned a 
bachelor’s or an advanced degree (a master’s, doctorate, or professional degree). By both measures 
there are very significant ethnic differences. In general, the results reflect a pattern of transmission of 
educational (and socioeconomic) advantages and disadvantages from one generation to the other, 
observable in the children’s generation both in their high school grades during adolescence as well as 
in the highest level of education completed in adulthood.  
Intergroup differences in early achievement are clearly discernible in high school grades. Getting 
mostly As in high school were Asian students (40%), followed by whites (31%), with Hispanics (15%) 
and blacks (13%) trailing well behind. Hispanics were more likely than other groups to get mostly Ds 
and Fs (10%), and blacks to get mostly Cs (34%). A clearer picture emerges when these panethnic 
categories are disaggregated by nationality and generation. Mexicans in both the 1.5 and 2nd 
generations, as well as Cambodians and Laotians, were the groups most likely to get mostly Ds and Fs 
(14%)—but not the Salvadoran and Guatemalans, the majority of whom (53%) were B students. At 
the other end of the scale, fully half of the Chinese (51%) and Koreans (50%) were A students, 
followed closely by the Vietnamese (45%), but only a third of the Filipinos (32%) received mainly As, 
slightly above the proportion for whites. 
A decade or so later on average, what was the highest level of educational attainment they had 
attained? Overall, 10% were high school dropouts, another 17% had attained only a high school 
diploma, and 41% had some college experience (but no college degree). At the other end, among those 
25 and older, 27% had earned a Bachelor’s degree, and another 13% an advanced degree (or were 
enrolled in graduate or professional school). Virtually the same wide achievement gaps seen in high 
school are observable between groups in adulthood. High school dropout rates were much higher 
among Hispanics (18%) and blacks (15%) than among whites (8%) and Asians (under 3%). Asians 
(41%) and whites (31%) were twice as likely as Hispanics (14%) and blacks (18%) to have earned a 
Bachelor’s degree, and in addition Asians (18%) and whites (17%) were more than twice as likely as 
Hispanics and blacks to have earned advanced degrees (or be in the process of earning them). These 
results for a Southern California sample are only slightly more positive than those reported earlier with 
national-level survey data, and the interethnic group rank order matches the results precisely. 
Examining educational attainment outcomes more closely by national origin and generation reveals 
wider differences—suggestive of widening future socioeconomic inequalities segmented by ethnicity. 
By far the most outstanding level of achievement is observed among the Chinese, with the lowest high 
school dropout rate (a miniscule 0.7%) and lowest high school-only attainment (5%), along with an 
extraordinarily high 33% who had earned or were earning an advanced degree, and another 49% who 
had already earned a Bachelor’s degree (see Kasinitz et al., 2008, for similar results among the 
Chinese in New York City). They were followed closely by the Koreans (27% had earned or were 
earning an advanced degree, another 51% had a Bachelor’s, only 2% had failed to complete high 
school), and then the Vietnamese (14% had earned or was earning an advanced degree, another 44% 
had a Bachelor’s, only 3% had dropped out of high school). The Filipinos most closely resembled 
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majority-group whites, and the Salvadorans and Guatemalans resembled minority-group blacks, in 
their patterns of educational attainment. The Mexicans, Cambodians and Laotians were at the bottom 
of the achievement hierarchy, with the Mexicans having the highest dropout rates of any group.  
In the Mexican case, data permit a more detailed analysis by generation, from the 1.5 to the second to 
the 3rd+ cohorts. Here the patterns are not linear, but reflect, first, a very significant improvement in 
high school dropout rates from the 1.5 to the second generation (cut in half from 30% to 15%), and a 
slight improvement in college graduation rates (from about 14% to 18%). However, achievement 
peaks in the second generation: by the 3rd+, high school dropout rates increase to 18%, while 
involvement in advanced-level education declines slightly. 
Intergenerational Educational Mobility: Immigrant Parents and their Adult 
Children 
How do these patterns of educational attainment among young adults compare with those of their 
parents? Given the diversity of class origins among these nationalities, what evidence is there of 
intergenerational mobility in the level of education achieved by the adult children of immigrants vis-à-
vis that of their parents? Table 10 summarizes the relevant data for sons and daughters and for their 
fathers and mothers, looking at two extremes of educational attainment. The left panel of the table 
shows the percent of college graduates among them; the right panel, the percent that did not finish 
high school. In each a mobility index is calculated: in the former, the child-parent (C-P) measure 
shows the percent by which adult children exceed their parents in earning a college degree or more (or 
not); in the latter, the parent-child (P-C) measure shows the differential between parents and children 
in failing to complete high school. As such they gauge the extent of intergenerational mobility at each 
pole of the educational attainment spectrum. 
For the sample as a whole, we note first that females outperform males in educational achievement: 
daughters are slightly more likely than sons to have completed college degrees, and less likely to have 
dropped out of high school. But among their parents the opposite is the case: fathers were more likely 
than mothers to have a college degree, although both were about as likely to have not completed high 
school. The C-P differential is 13% (i.e., 13% more children were college graduates than are their 
parents—indeed, some are the first in their families to attend college); at the other extreme, the P-C 
differential is 24% (i.e., 24% more parents than children had failed to finish high school). 
Again wide differences in parent-child educational mobility are apparent between groups, by both 
ethnicity and gender. First, as points of comparison for the mobility experience of the immigrant 
groups, we provide data for native-stock whites and blacks. At the upper end (attaining a college 
degree), half of white daughters were college graduates (51%) compared to only a third of their 
mothers (33%), and white sons (47%) were also more likely than their fathers (40%) to earn at least a 
bachelor’s degree; the C-P index for whites was a moderate 12%. But fewer black daughters (23%) 
were college graduates compared to their mothers (26%), while black sons (25%) were somewhat 
more likely to have a college degree than their fathers (21%); as a result, the C-P index for blacks was 
  
Working Paper Nr. 14 | Page 29 of 46 
Table 10. 
Intergenerational Mobility: Educational Attainment of Sons and Daughters vs. Fathers and Mothers   
(Merged IIMMLA and CILS-III San Diego Samples) 
                       
 % College graduate or more C-P Mobility   % Less than high school graduate P-C Mobility 
(In percents) Sons1 Daughters1 Fathers Mothers Differential2  Fathers Mothers Sons Daughters Differential3 
 
(25 and older) (25 and older) 
         
Panethnicity            
Hispanic 20.9 21.7 10.7 8.4 11.8  53.3 53.6 20.3 15.2 35.8 
Asian 55.2 63.0 41.7 35.4 20.5  21.8 26.5 2.7 2.7 21.4 
(3rd+ gen.) Black 24.8 23.4 21.1 25.9 0.6  28.9 14.4 15.8 15.0 6.2 
(3rd+ gen.) White 46.6 50.9 40.5 33.5 11.7  15.2 11.2 12.3 6.6 3.7 
            
Ethnicity            
(1.5 gen.) Mexican 17.2 12.5 5.2 1.7 11.4  78.5 82.3 31.7 27.6 50.7 
(2nd gen.) Mexican 22.1 16.8 6.2 5.9 13.4  58.7 58.7 19.1 11.3 43.5 
(3rd+ gen.) Mexican 18.4 20.7 12.7 10.5 7.9  27.9 28.2 21.4 15.8 9.5 
            
Salvadoran, Guatemalan 17.0 31.0 11.1 7.9 14.5  56.6 55.3 16.0 15.0 40.4 
Other Latin American 34.7 37.4 31.3 26.7 7.1  27.9 25.8 8.4 6.0 19.7 
Filipino 37.4 49.2 43.7 49.8 -3.5  11.9 13.8 2.1 2.6 10.5 
Chinese 83.3 81.1 55.4 38.1 35.4  16.2 20.3 0.4 1.1 17.5 
Korean 74.8 80.0 60.3 44.6 24.9  8.8 12.5 2.0 2.4 8.5 
Vietnamese 50.3 68.6 24.7 13.4 40.4  36.4 45.4 4.1 1.4 38.2 
Cambodian, Laotian 12.8 19.0 9.5 5.5 8.4  69.5 81.0 6.8 6.3 68.7 
All other nationalities 48.9 44.7 39.8 32.2 10.7  19.5 14.8 5.0 7.7 10.8 
            
Total 38.7 40.4 28.7 24.6 12.9   33.2 33.9 10.6 8.7 23.9 
            
Source:  IIMMLA survey;  CILS-III, San Diego.          
1
 The attainment of 4-year college degrees or more is reported only for sons and daughters 
25 or older.  
       
2 High-end Child-Parent (C-P) Mobility Differential = mean college graduation rate of sons and daughters minus the mean of 
their fathers and mothers. 
    
3
 Low-end P rent-Child (P-C) Mobility Differential = mean 'dropout' rates (less than high school) of fathers and mothers minus the mean of 
their sons and daughters. 
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essentially zero, indicating no intergenerational educational mobility in college-level educational 
attainment. At the lower end (dropping out of high school), the P-C differential for both whites and 
blacks was in the single digits, reflecting relatively little mobility (although the dropout rate for black 
fathers was twice that of black mothers, 29% to 14%, while the dropout rates for their sons and 
daughters was 15%).  
Among Asians, however, daughters were far more likely than mothers to earn college degrees (63% to 
35%), and sons were also more likely than their fathers (55% to 42%); their C-P differential was a 
significant 21%. And at the other pole, Asian fathers and mothers were nearly ten times more likely 
than their sons and daughters to have less than a high school diploma; the P-C differential was also 
21%. Hispanics as a whole reflected a still different pattern, although also indicative of considerable 
intergenerational educational mobility, especially at the lower end of achievement: the C-P differential 
was 12%, but the P-C differential was three times greater, 36%. 
And again the differences are much sharper when examined by national origin and generation, rather 
than lumped into panethnic aggregates. Remarkably, over 80% of Chinese sons and daughters, and 
75% to 80% of the Koreans, had college degrees or more; their immigrant fathers and mothers also 
had the highest proportion of college graduates of any group in the study (40% to 60%), but the 
superior achievement of their children still produced a C-P index of 35% for the Chinese and 25% for 
the Koreans. The C-P index of the Vietnamese, 40%, was the highest of all—a reflection of the fact 
that, while only 25% and 13% of their fathers and mothers were college graduates, 50% of their sons 
and an extraordinary 69% of their daughters had already attained a bachelor’s degree or more. At the 
other end of the Vietnamese mobility story, the P-C index was 38%—a reflection of tiny high school 
dropout rates among the children, but large proportions among the fathers and mothers (36% to 45%) 
who did not complete secondary schooling in Vietnam. Indeed, the Vietnamese significantly surpassed 
the Filipinos, although Vietnamese parents were comparatively much more disadvantaged. The 
Filipinos, despite the superior educational profile of their immigrant parents (especially mothers, 50% 
of whom had college degrees), registered the only negative C-P index score: -3.5%. A lower 
proportion of Filipino children (especially sons) had attained a college degree, although they still 
achieved at about the same level as native whites. On the other hand, their high school dropout rates 
were less than 3% (much lower than the rates for white peers), producing a Filipino P-C score of 10% 
(suggesting upward educational mobility at the lower end). And the Cambodians and Laotians, the 
poorest and least educated of the Asian groups among both parents and children, reflected sharply 
different mobility scores: a C-P index of 8% (since very few are yet graduating from college), and a P-
C index of 69%, by far the largest of any group (because the high school dropout rates of the sons and 
daughters were less than 7%, compared to 70% to 81% among their fathers and mothers, who hailed 
largely from rural Southeast Asia). 
Among the groups of Latin American origin, the Salvadorans and Guatemalans exhibit moderate 
intergenerational educational mobility at the high end, with a C-P index of 15%, most of it reflecting 
the wide differential in college graduation rates between daughters (31%) and mothers (8%). At the 
low end of the achievement spectrum, the Salvadorans and Guatemalans show a large P-C mobility 
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score (40%)—reflecting the fact that more than half of their fathers and mothers had less than a high 
school education. The Mexicans, despite having a greater proportion of high school dropouts than 
other groups, had still achieved much higher levels of education than their immigrant parents—
moderately at the high end, strongly at the low end. In their case, because we have data for 
multigenerational cohorts, it is possible to examine how intergenerational mobility patterns differed 
for both parents and children.  
For parents, the patterns are strongly linear: among both fathers and mothers, college graduation rates, 
although small, increase from the 1.5 to the second generation, and are highest among 3rd+ generation 
parents; conversely, while around 80% of the parents of 1.5 generation children never completed a 
secondary education, that proportion falls to 59% among the parents of the second generation, and to 
28% for the 3rd+. However, for their children, the patterns are not linear: college graduation rates 
increase modestly from the 1.5 to the second generation, and more for sons than for daughters; high 
school dropout rates are significantly reduced from the 1.5 to the second generation, though more for 
daughters than for sons. In the 3rd+ generation, however, dropout rates increase again—suggesting a 
deterioration of educational outcomes among that segment of native-born Mexican Americans—while 
college graduation rates also decline for 3rd+ generation sons, though increasing modestly for 
daughters. In general, educational achievement appears to peak in the second generation, and to 
become stymied thereafter (a finding confirmed by Telles and Ortiz [2008] in their multigenerational 
study of Mexican Americans in Los Angeles and San Antonio). While the evidence points to upward 
educational mobility for Mexican Americans when compared to their parents’ generation, they 
nonetheless remain at the bottom of the status hierarchy when compared to their same-age peers in 
Southern California, with widening achievement gaps. Taken together, these results point to a pattern 
of sharp and broadening ethnic segmentation with respect to educational attainment—and, by 
implication, to the occupational and economic futures of the second generation. 
Predicting Educational Attainment in Adulthood 
 What predicts these educational attainment outcomes? Table 11 presents the results of multiple linear 
regression models examining the effects of hypothesized antecedent variables (reviewed above) on 
total years of education attained—the central outcome in this study of upward or downward mobility 
among children of immigrants. Controlling for age and gender, factors predicted to lead to educational 
success or failure were generational status, ethnicity (a proxy for modes of incorporation experienced 
by different immigrant groups, as roughly indexed by the contexts of exit and reception of different 
nationalities), parental status (education, homeownership, citizenship), family structure growing up, 
and early achievement. Also examined is the association of incarceration, childbearing, and linguistic 
acculturation with educational attainment. 
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Table 11. 
Regression of Years of Education Completed on Selected Predictors 
(Merged IIMMLA and CILS-III San Diego sample, N=6,135) 
  
  I  II  III  IV  V 
Predictors  B  t1  Sig.  B  t  Sig.  B  t  Sig.  B  t  Sig.  B  t  Sig. 
Age, Gender, Generation:                             
Age (years)  0.061  12.07  ***  0.059  12.71  ***  0.055  12.42  ***  0.053  12.81  ***  0.061  13.20  *** 
Gender (female)  0.206  3.75  ***  0.249  4.97  ***  0.294  6.19  ***  0.041  0.93  NS  0.151  3.35  ** 
1.5 generation  0.679  8.78  ***  -0.193  -2.09  *  0.513  5.32  ***  0.513  5.76  ***  0.409  4.46  *** 
2.0 generation  0.847  10.32  ***  0.230  2.51  *  0.602  6.70  ***  0.617  7.43  ***  0.512  6.14  *** 
2.5 generation  0.425  4.03  ***  -0.006  -0.06  NS  0.312  3.09  **  0.367  3.94  ***  0.347  3.82  *** 
Ethnicity:2                               
Mexican        -1.401  -17.96  ***  -0.766  -9.76  ***  -0.506  -6.92  ***  -0.345  -4.80  *** 
Salvadoran, Guatemalan        -1.010  -8.22  ***  -0.417  -3.51  ***  -0.359  -3.28  **  -0.239  -2.24  * 
Filipino        0.281  3.00  **  -0.149  -1.65  NS  -0.024  -0.29  NS  0.005  0.06  NS 
Chinese        1.297  11.10  ***  0.878  7.85  ***  0.571  5.50  ***  0.529  5.25  *** 
Korean        1.094  9.08  ***  0.624  5.40  ***  0.365  3.40  **  0.357  3.43  ** 
Vietnamese        0.766  6.97  ***  0.841  7.90  ***  0.507  5.12  ***  0.475  4.94  *** 
Cambodian, Laotian        -0.772  -4.76  ***  0.014  0.09  NS  0.109  0.75  NS  0.069  0.49  NS 
Non-Hispanic Black        -1.061  -8.48  ***  -0.583  -4.85  ***  -0.346  -3.11  **  -0.138  -1.28  NS 
Parental Status:                               
Parents not US citizens              -0.295  -7.60  ***  -0.291  -8.10  ***  -0.238  -6.79  *** 
Parents' education              0.396  18.89  ***  0.293  14.89  ***  0.250  13.03  *** 
Parents' homeownership              0.496  8.64  ***  0.343  6.42  ***  0.310  5.98  *** 
2-parent family              0.297  5.38  ***  0.184  3.60  ***  0.111  2.22  * 
Early Achievement:                               
High school GPA                    0.964  32.10  ***  0.868  29.48  *** 
Turning Points:                               
Been incarcerated                          -0.626  -7.51  *** 
Had child ages 14-20                          -1.267  -16.90  *** 
Had child ages 20-24                          -0.822  -11.75  *** 
Had child at 25 or older                          -0.126  -1.69  NS 
Acculturation:                               
Prefers English at home                          0.225  3.99  *** 
Speaks non-English very well                        0.195  3.53  *** 
                               
Constant  12.11  73.05  ***  12.99  78.48  ***  12.21  75.42  ***  9.44  54.59  ***  9.57  53.92  *** 
 R2 =   0.035  0.200  0.285  0.387  0.428 
                                                              
 
Significance: *** p < .001,   ** p < .01,  * p < .05,    NS = not significant. 
1
  Measure of strength of association (unstandardized regression coefficient divided by its standard error). 
2
  3rd+ generation (native-born/native-parentage) non-Hispanic whites are the reference group. 
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In the equations in Table 11, years of education completed are regressed on four sets of antecedent 
variables, entered sequentially into the analysis: (1) age, gender, and generation (the 3rd+ generation is 
the referent group); (2) ethnicity (non-Hispanic whites are the referent group); (3) parental status 
(parents’ education, homeownership, citizenship) and family structure growing up; and (4) early 
achievement (as measured by high school grades). Educational attainment is fairly well accounted for 
in these models: jointly the predictor variables explain more than a third of the variance in years of 
education completed (R2 = .387). Finally, (5) added to the equation in the last panel of Table 11 are 
two key life change events (becoming a teen parent and ever having been incarcerated), expected to 
derail post-secondary school trajectories; and two measures of language preference and bilingualism 
(preference for speaking English at home, and ability to speak a non-English language very well). We 
are interested in examining their associations with educational attainment, but the temporal order of 
their effects cannot be clearly established with cross-sectional data (e.g., an individual could have left 
school prior to or even as a result of being imprisoned or having a child). 
The first model in Table 11 enters dummy variables for three key generational cohorts indexing 
children of immigrants (1.5, 2.0, 2.5), with the 3rd+ generation (children of natives) as the referent 
group, controlling for age and gender. All three generational cohorts (and the 2.0 cohort more than the 
other two) are associated with the completion of more years of education than 3rd+ generation natives. 
All ethnic group indicators added into the equation in the second model have significant effects: the 
Mexicans, Salvadorans and Guatemalans, Cambodians and Laotians, and non-Hispanic blacks 
complete fewer years of education than 3rd+ non-Hispanic whites (the referent group), while Chinese, 
Korean, Vietnamese and Filipinos complete more years of education. Together these predictors 
explain 20% of the variance in educational attainment (R2 = .200).  
The measures of parental socioeconomic and legal status (parents’ education, homeownership, and 
U.S. citizenship) and of family structure (growing up in a two-parent family) have stronger effects on 
the outcome variable, above all parental education (t = 18.9). When these are entered into the model, 
the previously significant effects of Filipino, Cambodian and Laotian ethnicity wash out (suggesting 
that their effects are accounted for by parental status variables). The single measure of early school 
achievement (GPA earned in high school) has by far the strongest net effect on highest education 
attained in adulthood (t = 32.1); and once this is accounted for, gender fades into insignificance 
(females had significantly outperformed males in both high school grades and subsequent educational 
attainment). Most other predictors are attenuated in the fourth model but retain significant effects, 
while the effects of all three generational cohorts are strengthened—and the R2 increases to .387.  
Having been incarcerated, and having had children (at ages 14-20, 21-24, and 25 or older), have 
significant negative effects on years of education completed, confirming their association with 
downward educational mobility in early adulthood. The younger the age at which the respondent 
became a parent (especially before age 20), the more negative the effect. Once these are entered 
(becoming a prisoner and prematurely becoming a parent), the negative association of non-Hispanic 
blacks with educational achievement washes out, suggesting that it is explained by them. However, 
Mexican, Salvadoran and Guatemalan ethnicities retain negative significant effects on educational 
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attainment, while Chinese, Korean and Vietnamese retain positive effects, suggesting that, compared 
to native whites in this sample, there are additional characteristics about these groups not measured 
here that shape their divergent educational mobility trajectories. Finally, although we cannot 
disentangle a causal sequence with cross-sectional data, both language measures entered in this last 
model (preference for English at home, spoken fluency in a non-English language) are found to be 
significantly and positively associated with educational attainment, net of all other factors, suggesting 
that fluent bilingualism facilitates educational achievement (cf. Portes and Rumbaut, 2001, 2006). The 
R2 in this final model increases to .428. A similar model predicting educational attainment among the 
ISGMNY sample in New York City, with an adjusted R2 of .335, is reported by Kasinitz et al. 
(2008:144). In both the New York and Southern California cases, having a child had the strongest 
negative effect on educational attainment, while parental education (and high school grades in this 
study) had the strongest positive effect. 
Predicting the Odds of Incarceration and Teenage Childbearing 
Table 12 presents the results of logistic regressions analyzing the likelihood of having been 
incarcerated (for men) and of having had children before age 20 (for women). In both regressions, 3rd+ 
non-Hispanic whites are the reference group. In the equation on the left panel, predicting the odds of 
incarceration for males only, again the strongest determinant is early achievement (as measured by 
high school grades): being convicted and jailed for a crime, an overwhelmingly male phenomenon, is 
most strongly associated with poor educational attainment in adolescence (the Wald statistic is 53.8). 
That is followed in predictive strength by the generational status variables: compared to the 3rd+ 
generation (of native-stock white parents), the least likely to be incarcerated are the foreign-born 1.5-
generation children of immigrants (Wald=26.4), followed by the U.S.-born 2.0 generation with two 
immigrant parents (Wald=15.7), and more weakly by the 2.5 cohort with one immigrant parent 
(Wald=2.8), confirming the data reviewed earlier and the research literature on “paradoxes of 
assimilation” (e.g., Rumbaut 1997; Rumbaut and Ewing 2007). Parents’ education is negatively 
correlated with the likelihood of incarceration (Wald=24.2)—i.e., involvement with the criminal 
justice system is in part a function of social class. Having been raised in a two-parent family also 
reduces the odds of incarceration for men (Wald=17.1), while growing up in dangerous neighborhoods 
(with major problems of drugs, crime and gangs) increases the odds (Wald=7.8). None of the ethnic 
group variables was significantly linked to incarceration—they all wash out once the other predictor 
variables are controlled—despite the fact that non-Hispanic blacks and Mexicans had the highest rates 
of arrest and incarceration, suggesting that the variables that remain in the equation account for those 
associations. 
The equation on the right panel of Table 12 examines the effect of the same set of determinants on the 
odds of teenage childbearing among females. Like the equation predicting incarceration, lower GPA in 
high school was the strongest predictor of teen births (Wald=50.8). Unlike the equation predicting 
incarceration, most of the ethnicity variables emerged as significant predictors, except for the Chinese, 
Koreans and Vietnamese. With other factors controlled for, Mexican, Salvadoran and Guatemalan 
women were much more likely than other groups to have children very early, followed by non-
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Hispanic blacks and Filipinas, and more weakly by Cambodians and Laotians.4 Having been raised in 
a two-parent family significantly reduces the odds of teenage childbearing (Wald=16.4), while 
growing up in neighborhoods with major problems of drugs, crime and gangs increased the odds of 
teen births (Wald=4.8). Lower parental education, above all low maternal education, significantly 
increased the odds of early childbearing, as did having parents who were not U.S. citizens (who were 
also less acculturated and in more vulnerable legal statuses). And as with incarceration, generational 
cohort was significantly associated with childbearing among teenage girls: the 1.5 and 2.0 cohorts 
were significantly less likely to become teen parents, compared to 3rd generation native whites. Here 
again the evidence points to a protective or buffering net effect of immigrant families (cf. Harris, 
1999), which appears paradoxically to deteriorate with acculturation and generation. 
 
Table 12. 
Logistic Regressions: Predictors of Incarceration (for Men) and Early Childbearing (for Women) 
(Merged IIMMLA and CILS-III San Diego sample: N=2,971 males, 3,164 females) 
                      
  Was incarcerated (males)  Had a child before age 20 (females) 
Predictors  B Wald1 Sig. Odds  B Wald1 Sig. Odds 
Age, Generation:           
Age (years)  0.010 0.90 NS 1.010  0.000 0.00 NS 1.000 
1.5 generation  -1.164 26.43 *** 0.312  -0.936 21.56 *** 0.392 
2.0 generation  -0.777 15.65 *** 0.460  -0.737 16.29 *** 0.478 
2.5 generation  -0.360 2.79  †  0.698  0.057 0.09 NS 1.059 
Ethnicity:2           
Mexican  0.184 1.16 NS 1.202  0.954 33.00 *** 2.596 
Salvadoran, Guatemalan  0.213 0.64 NS 1.238  1.228 29.32 *** 3.413 
Filipino  -0.125 0.27 NS 0.883  0.625 8.79 ** 1.868 
Korean  -0.316 0.56 NS 0.729  -0.197 0.25 NS 0.821 
Vietnamese  0.006 0.00 NS 1.007  -0.202 0.39 NS 0.817 
Cambodian, Laotian  -0.175 0.17 NS 0.840  0.623 4.19 * 1.865 
Non-Hispanic Black  0.266 1.28 NS 1.305  0.869 14.18 *** 2.385 
Parent/Family Contexts:           
Parents not US citizens  -0.007 0.01 NS 0.993  0.360 19.86 *** 1.433 
Parents' education  -0.272 24.16 *** 0.762  -0.254 24.77 *** 0.775 
2-parent family  -0.507 17.07 *** 0.602  -0.430 16.38 *** 0.651 
Neighborhood drugs, gangs  0.377 7.82 ** 1.458  0.281 4.81 * 1.325 
Early Achievement:           
High school GPA  -0.588 53.81 *** 0.555  -0.487 50.85 *** 0.614 
           
Constant  0.051 0.01 NS 1.053  -0.337 0.71 NS 0.714 
Nagelkerke R2 =  0.175   0.221  
                      
           
           
Significance: *** p < .001,   ** p < .01,  * p < .05,    † p < .10,   NS = not significant.  
1
  Measure of strength of association (square of the logistic regression coefficient divided by its standard error). 
2
  3rd+ generation (native-born/native-parentage) non-Hispanic whites are the reference group. 
 
 
4
 Because the Mexicans, Salvadorans and Guatemalans, as well as the Filipinas, were Catholics and reported more frequent attendance at 
religious services, a separate analysis (not shown) inserted Catholic religion and frequency of religious participation as potential predictors, 
but found they had no effect on childbearing outcomes. It was not religious belief or behavior that was linked to the outcome, but ethnicity, 
which remained significant regardless.  
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Conclusions and Implications 
The magnitude of the extraordinary transformations wrought by the present era of international 
migration is vividly seen today in California, the nation’s largest state by far. Of the state’s 36 million 
people, as estimated by the 2006 Current Population Survey, over a fourth (27%) were foreign born—
as were a third (34%) of its workers. But half of all its children and teenagers (ages 0-19) were the 
U.S.-reared 1.5- and second-generation offspring of immigrants, as were nearly a third of all its young 
adults (ages 20-39). These generational differences are more noticeable still in Southern California, 
especially among the 16 million people concentrated in the three contiguous coastal counties of Los 
Angeles, Orange and San Diego: there, a striking 58% of the region’s children and teenagers (0-19) 
were 1.5 and second generation, as were 44% of all young adults (20-39). California’s future—and 
that of a country being transformed by immigration—will be fundamentally shaped by how the 
coming second generation is incorporated in its economy, polity and society. Virtually every aspect of 
that incorporation will be shaped, in turn, by the nature and extent of their access to and attainment of 
post-secondary education, and of the manifold payoffs to that education. Indeed, immigrants and their 
children are expected to account for most of the growth of the U.S. labor force in the coming two 
decades, with the fastest growing occupations requiring college degrees; in California, there are 
already not enough eligible college graduates to meet demand (Johnson and Reed, 2007). 
For the children of immigrants, their prospects for socioeconomic mobility hinge on their access to 
public colleges and universities—much as in the last century City College served as the principal 
conduit to higher education for the sons and daughters of New York’s immigrants, and as a trampoline 
for their subsequent occupational and economic futures. California’s system of public higher 
education is based on a three-tier “master plan” adopted by the legislature in 1960, which sought to 
balance the demands of excellence for the few and educational access for the many. Under the plan, 
the top eighth of the state’s graduating high school seniors (as determined mainly by GPAs and test 
scores) were to be eligible to enter one of the University of California (UC) campuses, the top third 
would be able to enter one of the California State University (CSU) campuses, and the community 
colleges would accept all applicants. Today, more than 2.5 million students are enrolled in the state’s 
109 community colleges, and eligible graduates can transfer to the CSU or UC systems in order to 
complete Bachelor's degrees; the 23 CSU campuses, which annually award about half of the state’s 
Bachelor’s degrees and a third of its Master’s degrees, enroll more than 410,000 students; and over 
220,000 students are enrolled in the 10 UC campuses, with eligibility in fact met by applicants ranked 
in the top 4% of their high school class; doctoral degrees are awarded almost entirely by the UC. In 
Fall 2007, based on the University of California’s annual statistical summary, of UC’s 168,000 
undergraduates, 43% were of Asian origin (including 17% Chinese) and 16% of Latin American 
ancestry (including 12% of Mexican origin)—though the respective shares of the Asian and Hispanic 
populations in the state were 12% and 36%—and the overwhelming majority of them were 1.5- and 
second-generation students. The 36% non-Hispanic whites and 3% blacks among UC’s 
undergraduates were underrepresented relative to their proportions in the population—and even 
among them, between a fourth and a third were children of immigrants. In the UC Irvine campus, of 
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its nearly 22,000 undergraduates, fully 55% were Asians, with only 13% Latinos, 26% whites and 2% 
blacks. At UC Berkeley, one of the most selective universities in the country, two-thirds of all 
undergraduates admitted as freshmen were 1.5- or (especially) second-generation students, with very 
high GPAs and parents who themselves had high levels of educational attainment. These skewed 
“ethclass” proportions confirm statewide the IIMMLA and CILS results reported earlier: on the one 
hand, California’s public universities are veritable factories of social mobility; on the other, they 
reproduce, reinforce, and widen social inequalities. 
This study presented findings from Southern California on the mobility trajectories of foreign-
parentage young adults, focusing on key ethnic groups (Mexican, Salvadoran and Guatemalan, 
Filipino, Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian) with distinct modes of incorporation, 
compared to native-parentage peers (white, black and Mexican-American). The outcomes examined 
are not reducible to a simple or single unilinear master trend, but are complex, multidirectional, and 
sharply segmented by class, ethnicity, and gender. Huge differences in parental human capital define 
the modes of incorporation of different groups: among groups preponderantly composed of immigrant 
laborers (Mexicans, Salvadorans and Guatemalans) and refugees (Vietnamese, Cambodians and 
Laotians), both fathers and mothers had less than a high school education on average; in contrast, 
immigrant Filipino, Chinese, and Korean fathers and mothers were far more likely to be college 
graduates. The former in turn were much more likely than the latter to grow up in less stable 
residential contexts and in poorer and more dangerous neighborhoods. Still, compared to their parents, 
all groups show inter-generational educational progress, albeit at very different rates. Compared to 
their peers, the Chinese and to a lesser extent the Koreans (both males and females) show exceptional 
achievement, as do especially the daughters (much more so than the sons) of Vietnamese refugees, 
with very high ratios of college-graduates-to-high-school-dropouts (ranging from 33 to above 200 for 
Chinese sons). In comparison, the ratios for Filipinos are moderate (about 18), but nonetheless surpass 
those for native whites (which range from 4 for males to 8 for females). The respective ratios for 
Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Cambodians and Laotians range between 1 and 3—i.e., there are slightly 
more college graduates than high school dropouts among them—close to the ratios observed among 
native black young adults (1.5). Among the Mexicans—by far the largest immigrant group—the 1.5 
generation is twice more likely to drop out of high school than to graduate from college; the second 
generation reverses the pattern, with college graduates slightly exceeding high school dropouts, as do 
among females in the 3rd+ generations; but among 3rd+ generation males, the ratio again falls below 1, 
with dropouts exceeding college graduates. 
These highly stratified results are not accounted for by differences in English language acculturation. 
On the contrary, for all groups without exception, proficiency in and preference for English is well 
established by the second generation, and effectively completed by the third among those of Mexican 
origin, with bilingualism rapidly atrophying (despite some evidence that fluent bilingualism is 
positively associated with educational attainment). At the same time, with increasing acculturation and 
from generation to generation, some indices of downward assimilation also increase—notably 
experiences of arrest and incarceration among males, and partly also non-marital and teenage 
childbearing among females. Paradoxically, incarceration rates are lowest among immigrant young 
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men, even the least educated among them, but they increase sharply by the second and higher 
generations, especially among the least educated. For that matter, the likelihood of growing up in a 
non-intact family increases from the first to the second to the 3rd+ generations; that in turn is linked 
with lower educational achievement, higher odds of incarceration and teenage childbearing, and by 
implication diminished occupational and economic success—widening social inequalities in a spiral of 
cumulating disadvantage for a not insignificant segment of these newcomer populations. 
Immigrants’ modes of incorporation differ not only by parental human capital, but by the context of 
their reception and legal status at entry (with or without state authorization). Indeed, an undocumented 
status has become a caste-like master status blocking access to the opportunity structure and paths to 
social mobility. It has become all the more consequential since the passage of draconian federal laws 
in 1996, and most recently since the failure by Congress to pass comprehensive immigration reforms 
at the national level, including the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) 
Act. Instead, hundreds of laws and ordinances have been enacted by states and localities aimed to 
achieve social control at the local level, and federal raids of workplaces and private homes and other 
enforcement campaigns have been intensified. Hundreds of thousands of immigrants have been 
deported (“removed”) over the past decade, severing families and leaving behind as of 2005 at least 
1.6 million spouses and children, many of whom are U.S. citizens (Human Rights Watch, 2007). Of 
the approximately 12 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S. (and nearly 3 million in 
California), an estimated 15% are children (Passell, 2006). They cannot be denied access to a public 
elementary or secondary education under the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution, as the Supreme Court ruled in Plyler v. Doe (1982). But about 65,000 who have 
lived in the U.S. for more than five years graduate from high school each year, and only between 5% 
to 10% of them go to college: without a means to adjust their status they are ineligible for most forms 
of college financial aid and are excluded from the legal workforce, creating a growing pool of 
acculturated young adults who are being forced further underground instead of forging educational 
credentials and occupational skills that would redound to the benefit of the state and the nation in a 
global economy (Gonzales, 2007). The predictable result is the structural reproduction of enduring 
ethnic inequalities in the second generation and beyond. As the native-parentage labor force continues 
to shrink in California and in the U.S.—a process that will be accelerated as the baby boom generation 
reaches retirement age—that is an outcome that a dynamic society changing by the day can ill afford. 
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Appendix. The IIMMLA and CILS Surveys. 
The IIMMLA Survey. The Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles 
study was a computer-assisted telephone survey conducted in 2004 among targeted random samples of 
1.5, 2nd, and selected 3rd and higher generation adults in the five-county Los Angeles metropolitan 
area, which encompasses Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino and Ventura counties 
(Rumbaut et al., 2003). For purposes of sample design, eligible adult immigrants were defined as “1.5 
generation” if they came to the United States to live prior to the age of 15; as “2nd generation” if they 
were born in the United States and had at least one parent who was foreign-born; and as “3rd+ 
generations” if both they and their parents were U.S.-born.  
Prior to the start of interviewing, targeted quotas for ten ethnic strata were established for eligible 
respondents between the ages of 20 and 40 in the five-county area, with emphasis on the largest 
case—the Mexican-origin population. The IIMMLA project also sampled a strategic set of other large 
immigrant and refugee origin-groups that were expected to differ in their modes of incorporation to 
the United States (the Filipinos, Chinese, Koreans, Vietnamese, and Salvadorans and Guatemalans 
taken together). All groups were assigned a separate sampling stratum for 1.5-to-2nd generation 
respondents, and targeted quotas of 3rd+ generation respondents were also established for Mexican 
Americans, non-Hispanic whites, and non-Hispanic blacks, following the model of the New York 
Second Generation Study (Kasinitz et al. 2008). The final design called for completing approximately 
4,700 closed-ended telephone interviews with random samples of eligible respondents, about 3,500 
with 1.5-2nd-generation respondents and around 1,200 with 3rd+ generation respondents. 
Multi-frame sampling procedures were used to improve the chances of finding and interviewing 
members of targeted populations. The first stage used random digit dialing (RDD) to sample and 
screen households in the five-county area, and using this approach the IIMMLA was able to complete 
sample quotas for Mexicans, whites, and black of all generations. For other groups, samples were 
compiled using RDD until the incidence rates of eligible respondents became prohibitively low. At 
this point, more specific geographic and race-ethnic sampling frames were used, targeting RDD to 
households in high-density Asian residential areas and those on lists of Filipino, Chinese, Korean, and 
Vietnamese surnames.  
The surveys were administered in English or Spanish using a computer-assisted telephone 
interviewing system. A total of 4,655 interviews were completed between the start of full-scale 
interviewing in April 2004, and its conclusion in October 2004. Of these, 2,822 (61%) were derived 
from interviews using solely first-stage RDD sampling, while 1,833 (39%) resulted from interviews 
using the augmented samples. To achieve this, a total of 263,783 different telephone numbers were 
dialed at least once, including 122,984 listings from the first-stage RDD sampling frame and 140,799 
from the augmented samples. These calls resulted in the identification of 10,893 adults meeting the 
eligibility requirements of one of the ten targeted sample subgroups. Efforts were made to complete 
interviews with 8,815 of these adults (in 2,078 cases the quota for the subgroup had already been 
filled).  
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The CILS Survey. The Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study followed for more than a decade 
the progress of a large panel of youths representing several dozen nationalities in two main areas of 
immigrant settlement in the United States: Southern California (San Diego) and South Florida (the 
Miami and Fort Lauderdale metropolitan area). The baseline survey, conducted in Spring 1992, 
interviewed eligible students enrolled in the 8th and 9th grades of all the schools of the San Diego 
Unified School District (N=2,420). [A parallel sample was drawn from the Dade and Broward County 
Unified School Districts.] The sample was drawn in the junior high grades, when dropping out of 
school is rare, to avoid the potential bias of differential dropout rates between ethnic groups at the 
senior high school level. Students were eligible to enter the sample if they were U.S.-born but had at 
least one immigrant (foreign-born) parent, or if they themselves were foreign-born and had come to 
the U.S. at an early age (before age 13). The resulting sample was evenly balanced between males and 
females, and between foreign-born and U.S.-born children of immigrants. Reflecting the geographical 
clustering of recent immigration, the principal nationalities represented in the San Diego sample (as is 
largely the case in the IIMMLA sample) are Mexican, Filipino, Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian, 
Chinese, and smaller groups of other children of immigrants from Asia (mostly Korean, Japanese, and 
Indian) and Latin America (most of the Spanish-speaking countries of Central and South America and 
the Caribbean).  
Three years later, a second survey of the same panel of children of immigrants was conducted. By this 
time the youths, who were originally interviewed when most were 14 or 15 years old, were now 17 to 
18 years old and had reached the final year of high school (or had dropped out of school). The follow-
up survey in San Diego succeeded in re-interviewing 2,063 or 85.2% of the baseline sample, with 
almost identical proportions of males and females, of native-born and foreign-born youth, of U.S. 
citizens and non-citizens, and of main nationalities. There was a slight tendency for children from 
intact families (2 parents present) to be overrepresented in the follow-up survey; other differences 
were statistically insignificant (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). 
During 2001-03, a decade after the original survey, a final follow-up was conducted. The respondents 
now ranged from 23 to 27 years of age, and most had to be contacted individually in their places of 
work or residence. Mailed questionnaires (which included detailed questions on language use, 
proficiency and preference) were the principal source of completed data in this third survey. 
Respondents were also interviewed by phone when possible; teams of trained interviewers visited 
respondents for whom no telephone numbers were available, but for whom their last known address or 
that of their parents was known. Over a period of more than 24 months of fieldwork, CILS-III in San 
Diego retrieved complete or partial information on 70% of the original sample and 82% of the first 
follow-up.  
For our purposes here, we merged the 1,480 cases from the San Diego sample for which complete 
survey data over the span of a decade was available. Unlike the first follow-up, where effects of 
sample attrition were negligible, the time elapsed between the last two surveys and the significant 
sample mortality relative to the original one, indicate the need for adjusting results for sample 
selection bias. Family composition and early academic performance were the principal predictors of 
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presence/absence in CILS-III in San Diego. Preliminary runs indicate, however, that adjusted averages 
do not differ significantly from those unadjusted for this source of error. (For details on CILS-III, see 
Portes and Rumbaut 2005.)  
 
 
